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Abstract 
Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of 
foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to 
come across the term ‘defence diplomacy.’  The traditional function of armed forces has 
been to prepare for and undertake the use of force.  As part of this role, armed forces have 
cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring 
potential enemies.  In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations 
has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have 
been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future 
foes. 
 
This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by 
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of 
broader foreign and security policy goals.  Recognising that defence cooperation activities 
have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between ‘old,’ 
meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly 
states, and ‘new,’ meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies.  
 
New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe 
those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, 
performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the 
armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and 
the adoption of the concept by New Zealand.  It looks at the way in which New Zealand 
has developed and managed its ‘old’ defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the 
example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.  It then explores New Zealand’s 
‘new’ defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such 
as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia.  Through these three case studies, the thesis examines 
key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of 
these key relationships.  The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s 
defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
 
Relationships between armed forces have extended back hundreds of years, as far back as 
the development of the modern nation state itself, and since this time these relationships 
have been inextricably linked to the defence and security needs of each nation.  Typically, 
these defence relationships have grown out of alliances and other security arrangements 
between nations. 
 
New Zealand, for its part, has maintained a range of such traditional defence relationships 
with states in Asia including Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.  The 
origins of these relationships lay in providing support to the security of allies and were 
primarily about countering common enemies.  Cooperation and assistance took the form 
of the provision of training and conducting exercises to improve fighting abilities, to 
ensure equipment was maintained and available, and to improve the ability of these forces 
to operate alongside New Zealand forces and those of our major allies in the region in the 
event of conflict. 
 
A feature of post-Cold War international relations was the introduction and use of the 
term ‘defence diplomacy.’  First coined by the United Kingdom in the late 1990s, the 
term described the increasing use of military cooperation and assistance beyond friendly 
states out to engage former and potential enemies.  The term defence diplomacy, initially 
used by Western militaries to describe their engagement of the armed forces of the former 
Eastern Bloc, spread in popularity to the extent that most armed forces around the world 
now describe defence diplomacy in one form or another as a core task. 
 
Defence diplomacy represented a shift in the nature of relationships between armed forces 
by extending defence cooperation beyond friendly allied states to former or potential 
enemies.  A distinction can therefore be drawn between ‘old’ defence diplomacy, 
meaning traditional relationships with allies, and ‘new’ defence diplomacy, meaning 
engagement with non-like-minded states. This shift is examined in this thesis, particularly 
the way it has applied to New Zealand’s new and established partners in Asia.  Asia is the 
focus of this study because it is the location of both New Zealand’s oldest formal alliance 
partners (Singapore and Malaysia) and the location of some of New Zealand’s newest 
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defence relationships (Viet Nam, China and the renewed relationship with democratic 
Indonesia).   
 
The aim of the thesis is to determine whether New Zealand’s defence relations have 
significantly changed in this period and whether its defence diplomacy also fulfils similar 
roles to those of other states such as the United Kingdom.   This study will do so by 
examining New Zealand’s defence links with our traditional security partners in Asia and 
then compare these with our developing relationships with the armed forces of non-like-
minded nations.   
 
Specifically, this thesis will ask: 
 
 What explained the expansion of defence cooperation activities after the end of the 
Cold War? 
 Where did defence diplomacy originate and how is it defined?  
 When did New Zealand adopt the concept of defence diplomacy? 
 How it has been employed by New Zealand and for what ends?  
 Why do other countries engage with New Zealand armed forces? 
 Are there different perspectives on defence diplomacy between the NZDF and the 
Ministry of Defence? 
 Have defence diplomacy activities affected the conduct of traditional defence 
cooperation?  
 
The thesis argues that while New Zealand was an enthusiastic early adopter of the 
concept, its use has been inconsistent and it has been employed for different purposes.  It 
contends that there is an appreciable difference in the way it was perceived by different 
organs of the state, including between the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  Despite this, the distinction 
drawn between traditional and new forms of defence cooperation first identified by 
Cottey and Forster remains valid and New Zealand’s defence diplomacy can be readily 
understood in that way. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, defence diplomacy excludes treaties or formal alliances. 
Nor does it cover coercive diplomacy, such as gunboat diplomacy or other forms in which 
the military is used to apply or threaten to apply the use of force.  Being focussed on Asia, 
this thesis also does not look at the particular obligations for defence New Zealand has 
towards the Cook Islands and Niue, or the treaty relationship with Samoa.   
 
Methodology 
Research for this study is based largely on a close reading and critical analysis of a wide 
range of primary and secondary sources. As the Royal United Services Institute, a UK-
based independent defence and security think tank, noted in 2006: 
 
 Defence diplomacy continues to be given a relatively low profile... Specialist academics 
have conducted some conceptual analyses and there have been a number of studies of 
specific defence diplomacy initiatives, especially in conflict prevention. There has been 
very little comparative discussion of national and multilateral efforts in this dynamic policy 
area.
1
  
 
In this case, documents have been produced by foreign and defence ministries and armed 
forces, by non-governmental organisations, researchers and academics. They range from 
official reports, White Papers, policy papers, files and speeches, to journal articles and 
websites.   
 
Material was obtained through a search of the internet and through a search of selected 
library databases.  Most of the literature on the concept of defence diplomacy comes from 
the United Kingdom, which adopted the idea as a core part of defence policy, and the 
United States, with smaller amounts from Australia and New Zealand.  There was a 
surprising amount of informative material originating within South East Asia in recent 
years.  
 
As is to be expected with a topic like this, some material was not available because it 
remained classified in the files of the Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Defence 
Force (NZDF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT).  MFAT generally releases 
                                            
1 Royal United Services Association, “Defence Diplomacy: Transatlantic Perspectives,” no date, 
http://rusi.org/research/studies/transatlantic/news/ref:N4567118C822D6/. 
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classified files into public archives, only after at least twenty years and sometimes not for 
50 years.
2
  In this case, MFAT files did prove a useful source for historical information. 
 
Because of the dearth of primary material available on New Zealand’s conduct of defence 
diplomacy it became necessary to conduct interviews with decision-makers and those 
involved with carrying out New Zealand’s defence diplomacy.  In total, nine interviews 
were conducted.  They were approximately 30 minutes in length (but some extended up 
to over an hour) and were semi-structured.  A sample question list was prepared, based 
around a fixed set of questions about the development of defence relations and their 
purposes.   As each interview progressed however, points made could be elaborated upon 
or new lines of exploration pursued as they came up.  
 
The interviews were conducted in the final stages of the writing process.  They not only 
provided a wealth of new material, but also enabled the initial conclusions derived from 
analysis of secondary sources to be confirmed or reconsidered.  The study was limited in 
that only no officials of China, Viet Nam or Indonesia were interviewed and information 
about their perspectives had to be drawn from their respective defence policy, academic 
papers or from third country analysis (mostly originating in the United States).   
 
Thesis Outline 
Before examining New Zealand’s conduct of defence diplomacy, one needs to understand 
the context and origins of the concept itself.  Chapter Two attempts to describe the 
etymology of defence diplomacy.  What is it? Where did it come from? What accounts 
for the term’s recent rise?  How are the various forms of defence diplomacy 
differentiated?  To what purposes is it used?  This chapter goes on to describe the 
criticism and debates the concept has generated, as well as some of the issues that arise 
when carrying out defence diplomacy.   
 
Chapter Three focuses more on the practice of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy.  The 
first part reviews when and how New Zealand has employed the term, and then goes on to 
discuss the broad range of defence activities that comprise New Zealand defence 
                                            
2 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “MFAT Releases Classified Files to Public,” August 
2, 2012, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Features/415-MFAT-Releases-Classified-
Files.php. 
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diplomacy.  In order to illustrate the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ defence 
diplomacy, it includes a discussion about New Zealand’s primary and long-standing 
defence relationship in Asia, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).  This 
provides insights into how ‘old’ defence diplomacy works.  A subsequent section 
examines ‘new’ defence diplomacy and introduces some of the dilemmas and issues 
caused by its conduct.  It also provides an introduction to the three case studies in which 
these dilemmas and issues can be explored in more detail.  
 
Chapter Four, the first of the case studies, explores the development of New Zealand’s 
defence diplomacy with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The relationship with 
the PLA could be considered the first and the most extensive of New Zealand’s ‘new’ 
defence diplomacy ties.  This case study builds on existing writing on Sino-NZ relations, 
exploring the bilateral defence relationship, which is often neglected.  The case study will 
also add to the body of work on China’s defence relations with other countries, 
particularly the United States and Australia, complementing these works by providing a 
small nation perspective.  It places Sino-New Zealand defence diplomacy within the 
context of the development of New Zealand’s wider political and economic relationship 
and presents research gathered on the metrics of Sino-New Zealand defence engagement. 
It also seeks to identify what the PLA is seeking from its relationship with New Zealand. 
The chapter analyses those dilemmas and issues posed by the NZDF-PLA relationship 
and concludes with a short analysis of the prospects for the defence relationship. 
 
Chapter Five looks at the Viet Nam – New Zealand defence relationship, examining  how 
defence relations between these two former adversaries came about. What does each side 
seek from defence engagement? How have issues such as conditionality and reciprocity 
affected the relationship?  Viet Nam represents another useful example of where defence 
diplomacy and the interests of ‘New Zealand Inc’ coincide and how defence relations 
fulfil wider foreign policy objectives. Engagement with Viet Nam is also particularly 
poignant considering New Zealand's contribution to the Vietnam War. 
 
New Zealand’s defence diplomacy with Indonesia presents a different case to China and 
Viet Nam. It provides a key example in which to explore the issue of conditionality and 
the debate around defence engagement with non-democratic regimes, particularly military 
dictatorships. Chapter Six examines the long history of New Zealand defence relations 
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with Indonesia in two phases: up to 1999 and after 2000, in order to understand the way 
in which the application of conditions and the wider dilemma of engagement with 
authoritarian regimes has played out for New Zealand.  
 
The thesis closes with a brief conclusion that draws together the main findings from the 
cases and discusses the importance of defence diplomacy in contemporary New Zealand 
defence relations. 
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Chapter Two Defence Diplomacy in Context 
 
Better to send middle aged men abroad to bore each other, than send young 
men abroad to kill each other. 
  
Robin Cook, former United Kingdom Foreign Secretary 
 
Introduction 
The traditional role of the armed forces is the use of force, or the threat thereof, for the 
purposes of defence, deterrence, compulsion or intervention.  But armed forces have also 
traditionally had another role; cooperating with other militaries.  Armed forces have 
developed ties with their allies around the world; providing arms, military training and 
other forms of assistance, as well as engaging in bilateral and multilateral defence 
cooperation.   
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the lines between defence, security and foreign policy 
issues have become increasingly blurred.  Within this context, the defence cooperation 
role of the armed forces has also changed.  Defence ministries and militaries have taken 
on a wider range of peacetime cooperative and assistance tasks, and have operated more 
as a tool of foreign and security policy.  There has been recognition that war is not the 
only means of international policy to which armed forces are suited.  Activities such as 
security sector reform that seek to develop appropriate, legitimate and effective security 
forces in countries susceptible to state weakness and challenges to their legitimacy are a 
response to the emerging security challenges of the post-Cold War period.  More 
generally, armed forces have been rebalancing their effort towards proactive, long-term 
engagement activities; building trust to achieve influence as recognition has grown that 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on prevention of conflict, as opposed to the conduct 
of conflict.  This development became known as defence diplomacy. 
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What then does the term mean?  Broadly speaking, defence diplomacy can be regarded as 
the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces as a tool of foreign and security policy.
3
  
Defence diplomacy has been described as “one of the organising principles used to help 
the West come to terms with the new international security environment.”4  It becomes 
problematic when trying to further define the term as it has been used to describe a 
multitude of activities and tends to mean different things to different people within 
different organisations.  A variety of defence cooperation activities and their purposes are 
often confused together under this umbrella term.  Defence diplomacy is used at different 
levels; on one hand being used as an all-encompassing term for various types of military 
cooperation activities, while on the other it is often regarded as a discrete activity that is a 
subset of other types of military engagement.  It also goes by many other names such as 
military diplomacy, defence cooperation, or military cooperation.  China for example 
defines military diplomacy as “all diplomatic activities relating to national security and 
military diplomatic activities”, differentiating this from political diplomacy which is 
conducted by civilian or diplomatic officials.
5
   
 
Sometimes defence diplomacy is defined by its purposes. At a high level, some regard 
defence diplomacy as gestures of goodwill towards friendly countries.
6
 Another definition 
of defence diplomacy, influenced by British defence policy, was the “use of military 
personnel, including service attachés, in support of conflict prevention and resolution. 
Among a great variety of activities, it included providing assistance in the development of 
democratically accountable armed forces.”7  Anton Du Plessis, a South African academic, 
looks at defence diplomacy as a form of diplomacy and argued that the UK definition was 
distinct because of its security domain, military nature, and coercive or non-coercive use 
of force function.
8
  In an interesting development, and one that further confused the issue, 
the United States recently began using the term defence cooperation as a euphemism for 
                                            
3 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy : New Roles for Military 
Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Papers 365 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), 6. 
4 Wolfgang Koerner, Security Sector Reform: Defence Diplomacy, In Brief (Ottawa, Canada: Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service, 2006), 2, www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0612-
e.pdf. 
5 Yasuhiro Matsuda, “An Essay on China’s Military Diplomacy: Examination of Intentions in Foreign 
Strategy,” in NIDS Security Reports, No 7, 2006, 5, 
www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2006_2_Matsuda.pdf. 
6 John Leech, Asymmetries of Conflict: War Without Death (London: F. Cass, 2002), 61. 
7 Geoffrey R Berridge and A James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 66. 
8 Anton du Plessis, “Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to 
South Africa” (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 92. 
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arms sales.
9
  Regardless of the nomenclature, the key development in this regard has been 
the extension of defence cooperation to the armed forces of former or potential 
adversaries, or for the purposes of this study what are termed ‘non-like-minded’ states, 
something described by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster as ‘new’ defence 
diplomacy.
10
  The key characteristic of ‘new’ defence diplomacy that distinguishes it 
from other forms of military cooperation is its focus on former and potential adversaries 
towards helping build cooperative relationships (what they referred to as strategic 
engagement); promoting democratic civilian control of armed forces and supporting 
regimes to develop peacekeeping capabilities.  This study focuses on the cooperative, 
non-coercive military to military contacts “with countries that are, as United States 
General Henry Shelton put it “neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes.”11   
 
Origins of defence diplomacy 
The range of activities that are generally understood as occurring under the broad rubric 
of defence diplomacy have a long history.  One of the earliest forms of defence 
diplomacy occurred during the Thirty Years War (1618 to 1648), when the Duke of 
Richelieu dispatched French military officers abroad in order to liaise with allies, monitor 
military developments and gather intelligence.
12
  In the 18th century, this activity was 
formalised with the practice of assigning defence attachés to embassies, and by the 19th 
century most countries had defence attachés, facilitated by the emergence of national 
defence establishments and the building of colonial empires.
13
  Other notable events that 
might now be considered examples of defence diplomacy were the circumnavigation of 
the globe by the United States Navy’s Great White Fleet, and the establishment in 1927 
by the United Kingdom (UK) of the Imperial Defence College intended to train officers 
from the British Commonwealth and develop common doctrine.
14 
 
 
                                            
9 Surya Gangadharan, “US Courts India, Says Sensitive Weapons Tech Deals No Taboo,” India Global, 
July 24, 2012, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/us-courts-india-says-no-taboo-on-sensitive-weapons-tech/274093-
61.html. 
10 Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy, 8. 
11 Henry H. Shelton, “Shaping a Better World: Military Engagement in Peacetime,” US Foreign Policy 
Agenda, December 1999, 7–8, http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/1299/ijpe/ijpe1299.htm. 
12 David Law (Editor), “Defence Attachés” (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, July 2007), 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14
 Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy, 6. 
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Befitting its post-Cold War origins, what we now understand as defence diplomacy first 
emerged in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s.  Germany had been providing 
defence assistance to the former Soviet Union as early as 1990 to facilitate the withdrawal 
of Russian forces stationed in the former East Germany.
15
  It was not until 1994, however, 
that the German Ministry of Defence identified ‘military-political’ cooperation with 
former Warsaw Pact countries as among the core missions of its armed forces.  Reflecting 
a recognition that traditional perspectives of security were broadening and the role of the 
military went beyond deterrence and defence, the 1994 German Defence White Paper 
identified the need for the employment of a wide-ranging set of foreign and security 
policy tools for the early detection and, where possible, resolution of conflicts before they 
assumed a military dimension.
16
   
 
This new outlook was enabled by the end of the Cold War and the opening up of new 
policy options. The Germans not only recognised that their security was directly affected 
by how the situation in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe developed,
17
 but also 
began to look beyond Europe, identifying the need to promote disarmament and 
demobilisation, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America.   What is significant 
though, is that it was the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces, who were tasked with 
fostering international cooperation and integration, especially in Europe, by training the 
armed forces of the new democracies; by promoting dialogue on military policy; by 
participating in visits and exchange programmes for military personnel and in combined 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Western European Union exercises; and 
by sending personnel to observe United Nations and Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe missions and to verify compliance with arms control agreements.  
 
Another development that originated around the same time was Partnership for Peace, 
initiated by NATO in 1994.  Partnership for Peace was aimed toward building trust and 
confidence between NATO members and other states in Europe, notably those in the 
                                            
15 Sidney Bearman, ed., “New Challenges to Defence Diplomacy,” Strategic Survey 1999/2000 100, no. 1 
(January 1999): 39. 
16 Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
1994), para. 212, http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/Falem-cap1.htm. 
17
 Ibid., para. 311. 
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former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union.
18
  Each state was engaged bilaterally 
by NATO across a range of defence activities, with their level and pace aligned with that 
state’s own priorities, ambitions and abilities.  Such activities included defence reform, 
policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military to military 
cooperation and exercises, all aimed at supporting the individual state’s domestic 
reform.
19
  Partnership for Peace paved the way for some of these nations to join NATO 
peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, and later to join NATO itself, and the 
programme remains operational to this day. 
 
Around the same time, the United States military was formulating similar concepts such 
as preventative defence, which was introduced by then Secretary of Defense William 
Perry in 1996 to describe the United States’ programme of bilateral military exchanges 
with Russia.
20
   The United States has long had  a well-developed sense of the military’s 
role alongside other elements of national power. They consider relations between states in 
terms of ‘DIME’ - diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national 
power.
21
  In the context of DIME, the military was a core diplomatic channel through 
which conflicts can be resolved or prevented in the first place. 
 
The American form of defence diplomacy was part of a wider concept of defence 
engagement which covered two groups of military activity.  The first group was Foreign 
Military Interaction
22
 which included military assistance, military education, joint 
planning, exercises and operations, while the second group was defence diplomacy. In the 
American context, this was an unofficial term used to describe military and defence 
support of foreign policy in peacetime.  The difference between the two groups was that 
defence diplomacy activities usually occurred in a policy vacuum, were undeveloped, 
unfunded and not based on legislation, in contrast to Foreign Military Interaction 
activities which were.
23
  
                                            
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, ‘The Partnership for Peace programme’ 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topic_50349.htm 05 March 2012. 
19
 Ibid 
20 Bearman, “New Challenges to Defence Diplomacy,” 39. 
21 R. Craig Nation, “National Power,” in Guide to National Security Issues: Theory of War and Strategy, ed. 
J. Boone Bartholomees, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 165. 
22 United States Joint Staff, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01 Theater 
Engagement Planning,” February 1, 1998, A10, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2026. 
23 Alice Hills, “Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform,” Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 1 
(2000): 61. 
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The Americans considered defence engagement as a “shaping” activity.24  Shaping meant 
creating and preserving “conditions for the success of the decisive operation… by 
affecting enemy capabilities and forces, or by influencing enemy decisions.”25  The US 
National Military Strategy defined shaping in the following way: 
 
US armed forces help shape the international environment primarily through 
their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. 
The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and 
international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by 
promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring 
aggression and coercion.
26
 
 
This approach to defence diplomacy was criticised. Thomas Jordan and others pointed out 
that “shaping” occurred in all American defence cooperation and it was somewhat 
contentious that the US performed ‘shaping’ of even developed democracies and global 
allies such as Canada and NATO countries.
27
 
 
Closer to home, as early as 1993 Australia recognised the need for what is now regarded 
as defence diplomacy activities in response to the changing international order.  In the 
Strategic Review issued that year, the Australian Minster of Defence stated there was “an 
integral link between the defence of Australia and our increasing defence engagement 
with regional nations, the maintenance of our alliance relationships and our commitment 
to ensuring international peace and security.”28  As a harbinger of the dilemmas involved 
in defence diplomacy, the Australian approach attracted criticism for the tension between 
its policy of defence self-reliance and regional engagement.
29
  Other critics concluded 
                                            
24 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, 
Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington D.C.: United States Joint Staff, 
1997), 12. 
25 Department of the Army, US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington D.C.: United States 
Army, 2001), 4–24. 
26 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, 
Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era, 12. 
27 Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, and Thomas-Durell Young, “Shaping” the World through 
Engagement: Assessing the Department of Defense’s Theater Engagement Planning Process (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 19–20. 
28 Australian Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1993), iii, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/oscdf/se/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part1.pdf. 
29 Fedor A. Mediansky, Australian Foreign Policy: Into the New Millenium (Melbourne, Australia: 
Macmillan, 1997), 88. 
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that the two elements were simply contemporary versions of two long-standing 
components of Australian defence policy.
30
 
 
From 1993 Australia increased its cooperative defence activities with Asia-Pacific 
countries, including conducting more exercises with members of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and establishing a number of bilateral defence 
arrangements with countries in the region, including the 1996 Lombok Treaty with 
Indonesia; a security pact whose aims included the promotion of cooperative activities.
31
 
 
Defence Diplomacy is born 
Thus, while a number of countries had engaged in a range of military cooperative and 
assistance activities for much of the 1990s, it was not until the end of that decade that the 
term defence diplomacy was first used during the UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR).  
Initiated in 1997, this review was the first comprehensive examination of defence policy 
conducted by the British government since 1993 and took account of developments in the 
post-Cold War world such as the burgeoning of international peace support operations.  
The SDR represented a reassessment of Britain’s security interests and defence needs, 
and set out the roles, missions and capabilities of the UK armed forces to “meet these new 
realities.”32 
 
In a departure from previous British defence policy, the SDR described a new role for 
defence in promoting understanding and trust between all European forces, and in 
particular assisting the development of modern democratic armed forces in central and 
Eastern Europe.
33
  One of the core Missions, which was termed Defence Diplomacy 
(hereafter captialised when referring to the UK military Mission), was developed to meet 
the Labour government’s activist foreign policy in the new strategic environment.  As 
stated in the SDR, the Defence Diplomacy Mission was intended to: 
 
                                            
30
 Ibid. 
31 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the ‘Security Agreement’ with Australia,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997): 235. 
32 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper 1 (London: Director General 
Corporate Communication, 2000), 2.  
33 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, 12, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-
4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf. 
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…provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of 
Defence to dispel hostility build and maintain trust and assist in the 
development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a 
significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.
34
 
 
To help explain the concept, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a specific 
supplementary paper on Defence Diplomacy as part of the SDR.  In it, the Ministry 
acknowledged that while the idea of defence diplomacy was not new, there was greater 
scope for doing more to help prevent conflicts escalating or occurring in the first place.  
The Defence Diplomacy Mission would be the military’s contribution to this objective.35  
The use of the word ‘diplomacy’ reflected the way in which these activities conducted by 
armed forces contributed to foreign policy.  As expressed in the SDR, “We require armed 
forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and 
development levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict.”36 
 
The term defence diplomacy was reportedly coined by Secretary for Defence George 
Robertson,
37
 who injected it into the Ministry’s review process.  When introducing 
Defence Diplomacy in the supporting paper, Robertson described it in almost spiritual 
terms as “disarmament of the mind.”  While he may have coined the concept,38 it seems 
likely that the idea grew out of (or was given further impetus by) comments received 
during the review process that identified a need for more preventive diplomacy 
(diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the 
spread of conflicts when they occur
39
), including the use of aid to encourage economic 
and political development.  Some participants in the review process believed that it would 
be a wise investment to shift a proportion of British defence resources into aid and 
conflict prevention.
40
  Other submitters called for the conditional management of aid, 
                                            
34 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essay Four: Defence 
Diplomacy, 1998, 106. 
35 Ibid. 
36 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, 18. 
37 Robert F. Grattan, Strategic Review: The Process of Strategy Formulation in Complex Organisations 
(Farnham, UK: Gower Publishing, Ltd., 2011), 101. 
38
 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence Review Seminar - 5 November 1997 Summary 
of Opening Remarks by George Robertson MP, Secretary of State for Defence,” November 5, 1997, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000302155910/http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/sem1197.htm. 
39 David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia Pacific Securty Lexicon, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2007), 185. 
40 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence Review: Summaries of Seminars Held on 3 
and 11 July 1997,” accessed August 18, 2011, 
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offers of training, assistance to civil structures and trade controls, as well as the need to 
ensure that ethical aspects of foreign policy were not just seen as negative options, such 
as the imposition of embargoes, but that positive steps by the military were considered 
that could be taken with others “in making a better world.”41 
 
In the SDR, Defence Diplomacy was made into one of the eight core missions of Britain’s 
armed forces in order to provide impetus, to signal its importance, and to ensure it was 
properly linked to wider Government policy objectives.  Under the British taxonomy, 
Defence Diplomacy did not include multinational defence cooperation, which was 
included as a separate Mission.  ‘Outreach’ activities and various military assistance 
programmes were all described as largely bilateral activities.
42
  The only area in which 
multilateral defence cooperation was employed as part of Defence Diplomacy was in the 
realm of arms control.  As defined by the UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy 
covered the range of activities outlined in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: United Kingdom Defence Diplomacy Activities
43
 
1. Ministry of Defence training courses and education programmes, including opportunities 
for overseas students to attend courses at our military training establishments. 
 
2. Provision of Loan Service Personnel, Short Term Training Teams, and civilian and 
military advisers to overseas governments for extended periods. 
 
3. Visits by ships, aircraft and other military units. 
 
4. Inward and outward visits by Ministers and by military and civilian personnel at all levels. 
 
5. Staff talks,
44
 conferences and seminars to improve mutual understanding. 
 
6. Exchanges of civilian and military personnel. 
 
7. Exercises. 
 
 
In terms of structure, sixteen specific Military Tasks were drawn from the eight core 
Missions set out in the SDR, which then formed the basis for identifying the force 
structures required by the British armed forces.
45
  The Defence Diplomacy Mission 
                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, 7. 
43 Ibid., 4. 
44 Staff talks are systematic formal ongoing exchanges between headquarters’ staff.  
45
 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, 18. 
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consisted of three specific Military Tasks.  The first was arms control, non-proliferation 
and confidence and security building measures; the second was ‘outreach’ activities 
specifically designed to contribute to security and stability in eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union through bilateral assistance and cooperation programmes; and the 
last covered those military assistance programmes with overseas military forces and 
defence communities not covered under ‘outreach’ activities.46  A range of other activities 
undertaken by the UK defence establishment including providing education scholarships 
and linkages to academia in foreign countries were also regarded as underpinning the 
defence diplomacy mission.  In terms of its geographical focus, British Defence 
Diplomacy looked primarily at erstwhile adversaries in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and former Warsaw Pact.   
 
In summary, the UK policy of Defence Diplomacy represented a recognition and 
normalisation of developments over the previous decade in which the UK armed forces 
were being employed to assist the reform of the militaries of former Eastern bloc states in 
line with the political reform of their governments.  Two key developments in the 
international security environment would each have an impact on the purposes for and the 
manner in which Defence Diplomacy was employed; these were the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq and its aftermath.  
 
Britain’s Defence Diplomacy after September 2001 
It might have been expected that The War on Terror may have led to a shift back to ‘old’ 
patterns of defence diplomacy, focused on supporting authoritarian regimes and training 
their forces in counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency techniques.  However, the 
opposite was the case, and the September 11 terrorist attacks spurred a resurgence in 
defence diplomacy activity, which saw terrorism as another form of conflict that could be 
prevented through military engagement activities. 
 
In line with this thinking, the UK MoD revisited Defence Diplomacy as part of its new 
look at the 1998 SDR.  The result of this mid-point review, named the ‘New Chapter’, 
highlighted the importance of Defence Diplomacy in addressing the causes of conflict and 
terrorism, as well as the benefits deriving from its broad-based approach.  This was in 
                                            
46
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contrast to the expectation that Western states would turn a blind eye to poor civil-
military relations in the interests of stability in the post-911 world.
47
  There did not seem 
to be any element of conditionality introduced, whereby defence diplomacy was tied to 
issues such as human rights or recipients needed to demonstrate progress towards 
democratically accountable armed forces.  
 
The post-9/11 reformulation of the SDR gave higher priority to the potential demands of 
counter-terrorism operations than the UK MoD ever did before, including the potential 
for particular countries to be partners in and to provide support to the War on Terror.  As 
part of this role, Defence Diplomacy was attractive because of its perceived large area of 
engagement, high degree of influence and low cost.
48
  One new objective of Defence 
Diplomacy identified in the New Chapter was the lofty goal of helping “less capable 
states build a society in which terrorism is less likely to emerge.”49  There was, however, 
tension and competition between the objectives of defence diplomacy as a means of 
promoting good civil-military relations and other issues such as assisting authoritarian 
regimes in countering terrorism.
50
  
 
Ongoing operations in Afghanistan and the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq 
provided another watershed in the UK’s thinking about Defence Diplomacy.  In 2003, the 
UK MoD released a new Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World.  
Most notably, this White Paper described non-operational international engagements 
conducted in support of the country’s long-term foreign, defence and security policy 
objectives by using the term ‘Defence Relations.’51  It explained that Defence Relations 
was a broader concept than Defence Diplomacy, and the adoption of Defence Relations 
resulted from the evolution in understanding and application of Defence Diplomacy since 
1998. 
 
                                            
47
 Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy, 32. 
48 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter. Supporting 
Information and Analysis, vol. II (Norwich: United Kingdom The Stationery Office, 2002), 19. 
49 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review:  A New Chapter (Norwich: United 
Kingdom The Stationery Office, 2002), 10, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UK_SDR_2002.pdf. 
50 Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy, 32. 
51 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper 
2003 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2003), 8. 
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The UK’s most recent 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) retained the 
focus on foreign policy-led defence activities, but interestingly no longer made mention 
of Defence Diplomacy.  While the term certainly continued to be used leading up to the 
review,
52
 it was not referred to in the final document.  Following the SDSR, UK Ministry 
of Defence prepared a Defence Engagement Strategy. In this strategy, ‘Defence 
Engagement’ was defined as “the means by which we use our defence assets and 
activities to achieve influence internationally.
53
  Most notably, defence diplomacy in the 
British context reverted to its traditional definition, revolving around training and support 
to allied armed forces, and conducted in the context of providing support to contemporary 
operations.  With the advent of ‘Defence Relations’ and later ‘Defence Engagement’, the 
term Defence Diplomacy in official UK defence policy as the prevailing means to 
describe relations with the armed forces of former and potential foes has disappeared.  At 
the same time that the concept of Defence Diplomacy was being downgraded by its 
creators however, it was gaining in popularity elsewhere across the globe.   
 
Wider adoption of the concept 
The first country to adopt the term defence diplomacy in its official defence policy after 
the UK was Canada, which outlined its approach in a Defence Policy Statement which sat 
within the 2005 International Policy Statement.  This document was designed to mark the 
beginning of a new and proactive whole of government engagement in international 
security and foreign relations.  The Canadians described defence diplomacy (which, as in 
the UK SDSR, was coupled with another concept which they labelled forward presence) 
as an important part of defence efforts to contribute to international stability and outlined 
it in the Canadian context as consisting of a range of both high-profile and less visible 
tools for building relationships and shaping the international environment.
54
  These 
included bilateral and multilateral contacts, including staff talks, ship and aircraft visits, 
and participation in exercises.  The purposes of Canadian defence diplomacy were 
described as helping Canada understand international security issues, enhancing 
                                            
52 Royal United Services Association, “Nick Harvey MP Delivers Keynote Address,” RUSI Analysis, July 
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democracy and civilian control and accountability of other armed forces.
55
 The Defence 
Policy Statement also identified that the defence relationships made with other countries, 
such as those in the Middle East particularly, assisted in the conduct of Canadian overseas 
military operations. 
 
Looking further afield, other countries where the term became popular included India, 
who used the term to describe a range of activities from their confidence-building 
exercises with members of ASEAN to their strategic engagement with Viet Nam,
56
 and 
Indonesia, whose defence department embraced the term in the mid-2000s.
57
  Singapore 
began using the term as early as 2000, when discussing bilateral relations with friendly 
countries and multilateral relations with a wider set of countries and institutions aimed at 
broader foreign policy goals such as “regional and global peace and stability.”58 
 
The New Zealand defence establishment and various commentators began using the term 
defence diplomacy from 2000, directly influenced by the UK SDR.  The way in which 
New Zealand has adopted the concept is the subject of the next Chapter.  
 
Debates and critiques 
One of the initial critiques of Defence Diplomacy came from the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS), which focused on issues around the engagement of states in 
central and eastern Europe by NATO members.
59
  It criticised the link made between 
Defence Diplomacy and NATO membership aspirations, the ‘military tourism’ aspect of 
defence personnel exchanges, the high cost of defence restructuring imposed on central 
and eastern European states (particularly at a time when these countries had many 
competing economic and social priorities), and the narrow focus on armed forces and 
state organs.  This critique concluded that unless the concept of Defence Diplomacy was 
rethought to address these issues, defence diplomacy would more likely become a source 
of tensions both within NATO and between NATO and states in central and eastern 
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Europe, and that its role as part of NATO policy would decline.  Such criticism from the 
IISS, particularly about military tourism, is significant in light of that fact it was the IISS 
that established the Asia Security Summit, more commonly known as the Shangri-La 
Dialogue, soon afterward in 2002. For some time, the Shangri-La Dialogue was the 
preeminent regular gathering of Asia-Pacific defence ministers and their civilian and 
military chiefs of staff.
60
 
 
Like the IISS, Henry Zipper de Fabiani argued that Defence Diplomacy would entail 
considerable political, social and economic implications for the nations of the former 
Eastern bloc, in terms of the conversion, modernisation and implementation of 
democratic control of armed forces.  Writing in 2002, Fabiani provided a European 
perspective on Defence Diplomacy and its suitability for application by France.
61
  While 
he agreed that the UK and France shared a common goal and approach to the use of the 
military in support of foreign policy and security objectives of stabilisation and conflict 
prevention, his analysis pointed out the differing focus both in terms of priorities and 
geography, that is, on training and development of regional peacekeeping capabilities 
within Francophone Africa.  This he summed up as “Nord-Sud du point de vue français, 
Est-Ouest du point de vue britannique.”62  His statement highlighted the fact that Defence 
Diplomacy activities were likely to have different purposes and different priorities and 
these would vary from country to country.  In terms of the concept itself though, he 
questioned the assumption that there was a worldwide single military culture, given the 
many fine details that differentiate military cultures and that link some militaries more 
than others.  His point is significant, as one of the means in which defence diplomacy is 
often thought to be effective is because of the shared profession of arms that link military 
personnel from very different backgrounds.  Fabiani questioned how suitable the concept 
was for France, but concluded that “Mais l’expression “diplomatie de défense” est sans 
doute déjà ancrée dans nos esprits : dans ce cas, il faudra s’en accommoder.”63 
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Essentially he meant the term was already here and in use; and the French would just 
have to make allowances for it.  
 
Alice Hills, an academic with a background in police cooperation and assistance in 
Africa, provided another critique of the concept. She concluded that defence diplomacy 
was an over-extension of every day military business and had little lasting potential.
64
  In 
some ways these concerns were mirrored by some defence commentators and by some 
within defence forces themselves who argued that it diverted the military from its core 
business of war fighting.
65
  Hill’s criticisms though were based on the fact that the 
concept appeared to cobble together a number of existing and proven elements but with 
the added expectation as a core military activity integrated with the activities of other 
government departments.  She also criticised the concept for its basis on an assumed link 
between defence, security and development.  
 
Contrasting Hills’ conclusion that defence diplomacy was an over-extension of military 
business was Nicholas Floyd, an Australian Army officer writing at the Lowy Institute, 
who argued for a military role as a ‘force multiplier’ for foreign policy.66  Floyd 
contended that many contemporary foreign policy issues like climate change and 
terrorism were becoming security issues, and were falling within the realm of defence.  In 
addition, in many cases the defence establishment was the only arm of government with 
the resources such as permanent planning staff to deploy personnel overseas at short 
notice.  Floyd noted that other government departments which lack this capacity easily 
become reliant on the military and tied into military decision-making processes.  Writing 
in a period in which diplomatic relations were rapidly expanding with a range of new 
countries, Floyd concluded that the military provided useful capacity to build these 
relationships if the diplomatic service lacks the resources to do so.   
 
Proponents of the concept of defence diplomacy included Cottey and Forster, who have 
written probably the most comprehensive analysis of the concept to date.  They saw that 
international military cooperation and assistance had been increasing and found that 
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patterns of cooperation had changed.  In their analysis, they pointed out that one of the 
limitations of defence diplomacy was its lack of utility as a means of confidence-building 
and improving political relations where there were real and substantive political 
differences between countries, such as issues over borders or territory or over wider 
questions such as the international norms underpinning relations between states.
67
  
Examples they provided of where this is the case included relations between Western 
countries and both Russia and China, or between India and Pakistan.   
 
While somewhat unavoidable, Cottey and Forster also identified that too great a focus on 
the military’s role in defence diplomacy could be an issue.68  They explained the risk that 
the pursuit of military cooperation activities would ignore other dimensions of good civil-
military relations, such as the need for parliamentary oversight and engagement with civil 
society.  As Chapter Six demonstrates, this was a risk incurred by New Zealand in its 
historical defence links with Indonesia.  Other literature has focussed on a darker side to 
defence diplomacy, that of the ‘militarisation’ of foreign policy.  The greatest concern 
here is that of ‘institutional convergence;’ its propensity to confuse the role of the military 
with that of other organs of the nation state; in this case, the diplomatic service and the 
conduct of public diplomacy.  It was Nicholas Floyd again who pointed out that, in the 
absence of diplomatic resources, defence channels provided powerful alternative 
mechanisms for achieving international policy outcomes in support of the conventional 
Foreign Service.  An op-ed piece in an Australian newspaper pointed out that: 
 
...the military has become comparatively more important for the government as 
a tool for foreign relations. This is due primarily to the decline in usefulness of 
more traditional mechanisms such as foreign aid, diplomatic recognition and 
trade policy.
69
 
 
According to Floyd, this could create tensions between defence and the group which had 
historically led in this context, the foreign service.
70
  For example, when considering 
Canadian participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue, the foreign ministry were wary of the 
defence department taking on a more prominent role in advancing Canada’s regional 
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engagement in Asia.  As one account describes it “the Canadian foreign ministry didn’t 
want the defence ministry stealing the limelight from them.’71    
 
To ameliorate such concerns, another Australian academic, Daryl Morini, recommended a 
synergy of civil-military efforts to shape Australia’s diplomatic strategy towards Asia.  
One of his policy prescriptions specifically included greater intra-regional military 
diplomacy, perhaps modelled on the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative.
72
 Specific 
measures suggested by Morini included the establishment of a multinational military 
training facility, military observer mechanisms and military exchange programmes.  He 
also suggested adopting NATO’s approach to preventative diplomacy and conflict 
prevention in Eastern Europe for use in Asia.  Morini warned that as these processes take 
place, the civilian agencies, particularly the diplomatic service, will become militarised in 
nature.   
 
The IISS also criticised defence diplomacy for institutional convergence. This criticism 
often arose where armed forces discuss their role in conflict prevention.  The IISS thought 
this was regarded negatively, particularly within military establishments, as distracting 
the military from its core role of war fighting, thus diminishing their capacity to fight 
wars.
73
  A related issue was the difficulty in reconciling an armed force’s primary task to 
defend the nation, with building sustainable defence cooperation with potential 
adversaries. The requirement to plan and prepare for warfare with such a potential 
adversary places an obstacle in the way of the successful use of defence diplomacy. 
 
Fabiani foresaw the development of military appreciation amongst diplomats on one hand 
and greater diplomatic skills amongst soldiers on the other.
74
  In a paper explaining the 
role of Defence Attachés, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
defined the main feature of defence diplomacy as “the combined use of diplomatic and 
military tools.”75  The question remained though whether it should be the diplomats who 
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decide the focus and amount of defence effort expended in which countries, or should it 
be the military who decides?  We will return to this question of which institution should 
take the primary role later in the thesis. 
 
Conclusion 
Peaceful relations between armed forces have been common and date back beyond the 
beginnings of the modern nation state itself.  Cooperative interactions forces have tended 
to take place within the context of national friendships or alliances, and centred on 
improving the military capabilities of allies and the capacity to operate alongside them in 
the event of hostilities with other countries. 
 
The post-Cold War period and the broadening security environment resulted in the 
recognition that defence cooperation was being increasingly employed, and in particular 
saw the emergence of ‘new’ defence diplomacy.  The activities that comprised defence 
cooperation were not new, such as appointing defence attachés and conducting combined 
exercises, rather it was the changed nature and purposes to which it was being put; its 
chief characteristic being the extension of defence cooperation to the armed forces of 
former and potential adversaries. 
 
Although these activities had been taken place for some time, it was the United Kingdom 
that gave defence diplomacy prominence as part of defence policy and established a 
framework of key tasks and purposes around it.   Although the UK was the first to 
formally coin the term defence diplomacy, the concept itself had already been practised 
by other Western allies under different names.  Despite the term falling out of favour with 
the British by 2010, Cottey and Forster’s argument that defence diplomacy was “a 
genuinely new and significant development with some lasting relevance”76 has proven 
valid.  Indeed, since its promulgation by the UK, the concept has been adopted by a 
widening range of countries including New Zealand.  The NZDF both maintains long-
standing traditional relationships with allies in Asia and has established new relationships 
with non-like-minded partners such as China, Viet Nam and India.  New Zealand’s 
defence diplomacy activities in Asia therefore provide a series of useful case studies that 
illustrate how the tensions and issues identified above have played out. 
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The way in which New Zealand has adopted the concept of defence diplomacy is the 
subject of the next chapter.  It looks at the nature of New Zealand’s ‘old’ defence 
diplomacy, using the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements which have 
linked New Zealand to our chief allies in Asia – Singapore and Malaysia – since 1971.  It 
will also introduce New Zealand’s ‘new’ defence diplomacy in Asia together with its 
attendant issues and dilemmas. These will be explored in further detail in the subsequent 
case studies. 
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Chapter Three New Zealand’s Defence Diplomacy in Asia 
 
Introduction 
In order to explore New Zealand’s conduct of defence diplomacy and discuss the issues 
and tensions it posed from a New Zealand perspective, this chapter begins by looking at 
the origins of New Zealand’s usage of the term and employment of the concept.  It then 
looks at traditional forms of New Zealand defence diplomacy, exemplified by the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). To contrast New Zealand’s experience in 
traditional defence relationships with the ‘new’ defence diplomacy, it is necessary to look 
at the development of defence relations with countries that are “neither staunch friends 
nor confirmed foes.”77  The last section introduces the three case studies that will explore 
these relationships and their attendant tensions in more detail. 
 
The origins of New Zealand defence diplomacy 
A close reading of defence policy documents, including successive Defence White Papers 
since the late 1970s, suggests little detailed discussion of defence diplomacy activities 
took place in New Zealand until the publication of the 2010 Defence White Paper.
78
 
 
Writing in 1997, former New Zealand Army officer and defence analyst Jim Rolfe argued 
military relationships were “an important practical and symbolic definer of international 
linkages and of the ebb and flow of international friendships.”79  This statement, made in 
relation to alliances and associated military relationships, also applies to the range of 
activities which we now understand as defence diplomacy.  This was illustrated by the 
way in which New Zealand’s defence relationships broadened to include states like Viet 
Nam and China.   
 
In Rolfe’s discussion on alternatives to military alliances for New Zealand (which was 
published around the time that New Zealand was only just establishing formal defence 
relations with China), he considered that “the armed forces can and should be used as a 
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tool of international diplomacy in networking and confidence-building.”80  He argued that 
formal alliances were not necessary to forge genuine links between states to reduce 
uncertainty. Rather, military cooperation activities were an alternative instrument that 
could achieve the same ends.
81
  Rolfe went on to advocate for the development of New 
Zealand military links with all states in the Asia Pacific region including China, Japan 
and the ASEAN states, recommending that cooperation should begin with bilateral 
exchanges of ideas and concepts at the officials level, followed by individual exchanges 
and exercises. He saw military relations as one link in a web of political, economic and 
cultural relationships between New Zealand and the region, reducing the likelihood of 
conflict between countries and facilitating the formation of alliances in the event of an 
external threat.
82
 
The New Zealand defence review that resulted in the 1997 White Paper The Shape of 
New Zealand’s Defence was undertaken concurrently with the UK Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR), and while the New Zealand White Paper tipped its hat to the SDR, the 
two papers did not reach the same conclusions. While the UK SDR looked towards new 
opportunities to employ the armed forces in a wider range of tasks in support of foreign 
and security policy, Australian academic and former defence official Stewart Woodman 
described New Zealand’s policy as being “tied to a vanishing rationale.”83  The 1997 
White Paper didn’t go into listing the specific tasks of the NZDF, but spoke instead of 
New Zealand’s broad security requirements. These centred on “militarily effective 
capabilities” that were interoperable with allies and friends, that fulfil New Zealand’s 
commitments under the FPDA, that contribute to regional security, to collective security 
efforts and peace support and humanitarian relief operations.
84
  There was no mention 
made in the 1997 White Paper about relationships with any other states outside the 
parameters listed above. 
 
It was not until the 1999 report issued by the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 
Committee, entitled Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, that the wider role of defence in 
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New Zealand’s international relations was discussed.85  Significantly, this report 
acknowledged that it had been informed by the 1997 UK Strategic Defence Review, and 
it elaborated a more expansive concept of security operations.  The Committee recognised 
that: 
 
There are many situations in which the NZDF can be used and is being used 
in non-combat roles to help promote an international environment where 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights can be more fully 
exercised. This involvement is an important way of demonstrating that New 
Zealand is a good international citizen and a good neighbour in the South 
Pacific.  Of particular value in relation to advancing New Zealand’s wider 
interests is the extensive network of contacts built up by the armed services in 
the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.  We see more value in using the NZDF 
to support our wider international interests now, rather than in leaving it to 
concentrate on training and exercising for the more remote scenarios of an 
uncertain future.
86
 
 
This clearly favoured the employment of the NZDF in promoting democratic civilian 
control of armed forces.  The term ‘defence diplomacy’ was used in the minority 
members section of the Inquiry report, but they downplayed the concept in favour of 
more traditional applications of defence relationships: 
 
Whilst acknowledging the value of defence diplomacy, Government members 
view NZDF personnel and assets as visible signs of the nation’s willingness 
and commitment to assist in promoting stability in the Asia Pacific region, 
and many times a year our ships, aircraft and personnel deploy on training 
and goodwill visits throughout the region.
87
 
 
In a 1999 paper providing an independent review of the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 
2000, David Dickens pointed out that reductions in the NZDF’s military capacity would 
significantly damage New Zealand’s broader bilateral (and not just defence) relationships.  
Dickens considered that such reductions, such as the disbanding of the air strike 
capability and the decision to not purchase a further two ANZAC frigates, would not only 
damage our relations with Australia and the United States, but would also send a signal to 
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the region that New Zealand did not take defence seriously, damaging our relationships 
with Britain, Singapore and Malaysia.
88
 
 
However, the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 was not official defence policy, and so 
the first official use of ‘defence diplomacy’ in a New Zealand context came in the first of 
what was supposed to be a series of NZDF Capability Reviews undertaken following the 
release of the Defence Policy Framework.  The purpose of these reviews was to form a 
new basis for capability acquisition consistent with the direction of the Framework.  
Released in 2000, it did not mention defence diplomacy by name, but discussed the roles 
and tasks of the NZDF in the South Pacific and wider Asia Pacific region in the context 
of defence relations. Specifically it stated that the NZDF would: 
 
 strengthen our relationships in the Pacific through our Mutual Assistance 
Programme (MAP), including providing defence assistance and Overseas 
Development Assistance delivery;
89
 
 continue to participate in FPDA activities; 
 build upon existing co-operative bilateral defence relations with 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines; and 
 develop a broader-based defence dialogue with other nations in East 
Asia.
90
 
 
The New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews: Phase One – Land Forces and 
Sealift issued by the Ministry of Defence in 2000 devoted a section in its discussion of the 
NZDF’s Operational Environment to defence diplomacy.  It defined defence diplomacy 
as: 
 
all the varied activities undertaken by the NZDF to promote peace and security 
through constructive engagement and confidence-building. Its aim is to dispel 
hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of 
democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant 
contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.
91
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This definition paraphrases the definition out of the 1998 UK SDR.  The explanation 
provided in the document went on to borrow George Robertson’s phrase ‘disarmament of 
the mind’.92 
 
Within the NZDF, the notion of using the armed forces in a cooperative role was gaining 
traction. In the 1999 Purchase Agreement which set out the NZDF’s planned annual 
outputs, the long-standing Key Result Area pertaining to defence links with Australia was 
expanded to become “Maintain defence relations and demonstrate defence cooperation 
with regional countries.”93  The subsequent year, this description was replaced with 
“Defence Diplomacy” as one of the key priorities of the NZDF, which was described as 
“security relationships and international activities.”94  In the NZDF’s 2005 Output Plan 
however, defence diplomacy had disappeared, leaving the “management of international 
military relations” subsumed as a component within NZDF’s output pertaining to 
“Development and Production of Military Policy.”95 
 
The final piece of defence policy issued by the New Zealand government in the first 
decade of the 2000s was the Government Defence Statement: a modern, sustainable 
defence force matched to New Zealand's needs published in May 2001. Despite it being 
issued within three years of the publication of the UK SDR, and immediately following 
the Defence Policy Framework, the Government Defence Statement made no mention of 
defence diplomacy or any other iteration of military relations, other than in relation to the 
potential confidence-building role of the soon-to-be-disbanded air combat force.
96
 
 
In the end it was not so much defence policy, but rather defence doctrine that first 
cemented the introduction of the term defence diplomacy into the New Zealand lexicon.  
Unlike policy, which identifies and articulates defence needs and interests and is 
potentially fluid and changeable, defence doctrine is more enduring and less subject to 
change and its purpose is to describe the methods for successfully conducting military 
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operations.
97
  Doctrine is significant as it provides the perspective of the armed forces on 
what defence diplomacy entails and the ends to which it is directed.  The NZDF’s 
capstone doctrine document, Foundations of New Zealand Defence Doctrine, first 
published in 2004 provided the following definition of defence diplomacy: 
 
… activities (such as military visits, exchanges of military information, and the 
provision of military education and training) are intended to dispel hostility, 
build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically 
accountable defence forces.
98
 
 
Again, this was drawn from the British SDR definition.
 99
 New Zealand doctrine regarded 
defence diplomacy as a conflict prevention activity and placed it in context as the military 
component of the diplomatic instrument of national power.  Doctrine hinted that the 
military element is employed in direct support of civil objectives when it stated: 
 
 Diplomacy is enhanced by NZDF staff in embassies, the provision of 
operational military advice and assistance, the conduct of overseas training, 
and other influence activities.
100
 
 
In 2007, Rolfe again returned to defence diplomacy, arguing the modernisation of the 
NZDF in the 2000s had delivered armed forces whose equipment and roles demonstrably 
met New Zealand national interests. In particular, he identified that the NZDF had 
become able to deliver an increasing array of options to the government, including 
practising defence diplomacy.
101
 
 
By the mid-2000s, defence diplomacy had become one of the NZDF’s key priorities; 
entailing visits, exchanges, consultations and deliberations on non-conventional and ‘soft’ 
threats as well as military matters.
102
  Like Rolfe, Stephen Hoadley identified that new 
NZDF capabilities, such as the Protector fleet for example, was evidence that engaging in 
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activities like defence diplomacy alongside their civilian and diplomatic counterparts 
would be an expanding part of the New Zealand navy’s mission.103   This sentiment was 
echoed by the commanding officer of HMNZS Te Kaha when he explained to a reporter 
during a port call to China in 2007 that “most ports, we have what you call defence 
diplomacy. It’s a melding of military and civil diplomacy. We will generally co-host a 
function with the embassy.”104   Hoadley considered that soft power “was the sort of 
power a progressive small state like New Zealand can develop and deploy.”105  For a 
small nation in particular, rather than being a tool of coercion, the use of armed forces in 
defence diplomacy was a form of engagement which contributed to transparency and 
confidence-building.  Defence diplomacy in the New Zealand context was a means to 
enhance regional security by engaging other nations, reinforce shared international norms, 
and amplify New Zealand’s otherwise limited reach and influence. 
 
Prior to the 2008 New Zealand parliamentary election, both main political parties 
undertook to carry out a defence review.  In 2009, the new National Government began 
the first full review of defence policy in over ten years. The resulting Defence White 
Paper 2010 briefly examined the NZDF’s contribution to international peace and 
security. It stated that: 
 
“New Zealand will also contribute to regional and international peace and 
security by building various defence linkages. These can range from the 
assignment of defence attaches, through to formal military-to-military talks, 
and participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises.”106 
 
The White Paper (and the preceding Defence Assessment 2010) set out a number of ways 
in which these defence linkages added value to New Zealand’s contribution to 
international efforts to resolve conflict.  These were described as building influence with 
security partners and friends so that our interests are taken into account; helping to keep 
us informed of security issues; providing professional development for the NZDF; 
enabling the NZDF to be well-informed about defence technology and military doctrinal 
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developments; and adding engagement to our bilateral relationships, especially where 
partner countries place a particular value on defence relations.
107
 
 
While the overall message of the 2010 White Paper was that New Zealand was keen to 
rekindle ties with traditional partners,
108
 it acknowledged the new form of defence 
diplomacy as defined by Cottey and Forster.  Within three paragraphs under a sub-
heading ‘Support peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region’ in Chapter Four, the 2010 
White Paper specifically listed a number of defence and diplomatic activities that enabled 
New Zealand to uphold and contribute to the favourable environment engendered by a 
stable and prosperous Asia.  Specific activities included developing good bilateral 
defence relations with other states, encouraging them to operate constructively in the 
region and exercising and training with regional armed forces.  Notable is the geographic 
focus on Asia. It is evident that the rationale of these activities is conflict prevention, but 
there is a distinct lack of discussion about the role of defence relations in the development 
of democratically accountable defence forces.   
 
Robert Ayson recognises the reluctance in the White Paper to discuss New Zealand’s 
defence relationship with China, noting there is nothing at all in the declassified version 
of the Defence Assessment about it.
109
  This reluctance may have more to do with 
sensitivity about relations between the two countries rather than any particular absence of 
policy.  But Ayson questioned whether the White Paper’s failure to mention Indonesia, 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea demonstrated that New Zealand’s defence diplomacy had 
little role to play in the region.
110
   
 
While extant New Zealand defence policy acknowledged the purposes and means to 
conduct what was regarded as defence diplomacy without using the term itself, defence 
diplomacy has appeared in a number of subsequent official documents.  The Terms of 
Reference signed annually between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence 
Force, which set out the Chief of Defence’s duties and obligations in delivering the 
Government’s defence policy objectives, made explicit goals for defence diplomacy, 
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regional engagement and maintaining and strengthening the Defence Force’s network of 
relationships with overseas partners.
111
  The NZDF’s most recent Statement of Intent 
discussed ‘military diplomacy’ for the purposes of strategic shaping.112  The NZDF’s 
Output Plans, which record the output delivery decisions agreed by the Minister of 
Defence with the Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force each financial year, describe 
defence diplomacy activities in terms of naval ship visits and support to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.
113
 This suggested that the term was more in vogue with the 
operators or ‘service delivery arm’ of the Defence Force, rather than the policymakers in 
the Ministry of Defence.  
 
It should be noted that the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs also recognised the 
expanding role of defence diplomacy in recent efforts towards closer security 
engagement.
114
  Interestingly, under the umbrella term ‘security engagement’ MFAT 
differentiated defence diplomacy from ‘bilateral military ties’ and multilateral 
arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements in their Asia White Paper released in 2007.  It is unclear quite how MFAT 
defined defence diplomacy in this case.  
 
New Zealand Defence Diplomacy Activities 
New Zealand’s defence diplomacy encompasses a wide range of activities, few of which 
are new.  The country conducts defence diplomacy through various means including the 
appointment of defence attachés, port calls, combined exercises, educational exchanges, 
high-level dialogues, and multilateral cooperation.  
 
Table 2: New Zealand Defence Diplomacy Activities 
High-level ties 
Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials 
such as Closer Defence Relations (CDR) with Australia, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
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(ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA). 
Military to military contacts 
 Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military officials. 
Army to Army Staff Talks. 
Appointment of defence attaches to foreign countries. 
Bilateral defence cooperation agreements. 
Placement of military or civilian defence personnel in partner countries’ defence ministries 
or armed forces. 
Military Training and Education 
 Training of foreign military personnel such as at Command and Staff College. 
 New Zealand’s Mutual Assistance Programme.  
 Deployment of training teams. 
Development of peacekeeping capabilities. 
Exercises 
 Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes. 
 
High-level ties 
High-level exchanges typically preceded the formalisation of defence links and were a 
regular feature of mature relationships.  The institutionalisation of high-level exchanges 
into Strategic Dialogues tended to occur further along in the development of the 
relationship, but this was a key objective in terms of progressing defence links.  Former 
Defence Minister Wayne Mapp described bilateral Strategic Dialogues as “really 
important” and very much what he described as macro-level defence diplomacy.115  
Former Ambassador to China Tony Browne saw them as one component of a broad range 
of ties, pointing out: 
 
…you need to put that dialogue into context. We’ve got 27 or 28, or some 
colossal number of annual dialogues with China.  We’ve got them on dairy, on 
forestry, on quarantine, on consular issues, trade; we’ve had a security dialogue 
conducted by the foreign ministries for a long time, many many years. We 
have Pacific talks. I once did the logistic count of how many of these dialogues 
there were and we’ve got almost as many formal dialogues of this sort as we do 
with Australia.”116 
 
                                            
115 Author’s interview with Dr Wayne Mapp, 14 March 2013, n.d. 
116
 Author’s interview with Tony Browne, 11 March 2013, n.d. 
 Chapter Three  37 
 
 
Defence Attachés 
As discussed in Chapter Two, defence attachés were perhaps the earliest form of 
cooperative engagement between armed forces.  Defence attachés were significant as 
their appointment represented the formalisation of defence links between countries and 
they provided the long-term as well as the day-to-day contact between militaries.
117
  Prior 
to 1991, New Zealand defence attachés were part of the former Ministry of External 
Relations and Trade.
118
  The manner in which the attaché worked and the perspective of 
the country they were posted to had an impact on the nature of the defence relationship.  
Each defence attaché’s approach differed from post to post.  For example, China wanted 
the New Zealand defence attaché to be the facilitator of high-level contacts rather than the 
conduit of that contact; the Chinese did not want the substantive contact to occur through 
the attaché.
119
  In addition, the first defence attaché posted to China saw himself as a 
member of the international attaché legation, and his priority lay with international 
engagement rather than national engagement.  As a result, day-to-day contact between the 
attaché and the PLA was limited.  This was in contrast to the approach of the defence 
attaché in Jakarta at the same time, who had excellent contacts within the Indonesian 
military.
120
  New Zealand’s defence attaché network is reviewed approximately every ten 
years and within the last two years there has been renewed debate about the value and 
priority of the defence attaché network and where exactly New Zealand’s efforts should 
be directed.
121
 This debate mirrored that which took place about New Zealand’s wider 
diplomatic representation.
122
  Given the burgeoning of defence links since the 1990s, 
there has been increasing pressure on the attaché network.  Discussions with a range of 
officials raised the point that more thought needs to be put into deciding where our efforts 
would deliver the most value. The regular reviews suggest that this decision is proving a 
difficult one. 
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Port calls 
Port calls remain the most obvious form of defence diplomacy activity, and are often the 
first thing cited when discussing defence links.
123
  Port calls have a long tradition, 
predating the 20th century, and are a sub-set of naval diplomacy which includes both 
cooperative and coercive forms.
124
  In its cooperative form, ‘show the flag’ tours have 
been a common use for Royal New Zealand Navy deployments throughout Asia.  A 
single naval deployment to Asia is likely to involve a range of defence diplomacy 
activities including exercises with FPDA partners, patrols and visits to new partners like 
Indonesia, China and Viet Nam.  As the numbers in Chapters Four to Six show, port calls 
are one of the primary means through which New Zealand conducts defence diplomacy.  
New partners also place a lot of weight on the symbolic importance of naval visits.
125
 
 
Training and education 
Training and education is a significant part of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy.  One of 
the primary vehicles to deliver this is the NZDF Command and Staff College.
126
  Offering 
places to officers of other countries provides some ability to influence the officer cadre of 
their armed forces.
127
  As the former Commandant of the College, Shaun Fogarty 
explained “Each year, approximately 30 percent of the New Zealand staff course was 
made up of international course members.
128
  Fogarty described the impact of this on 
defence relations with China, Viet Nam and Indonesia, saying “those relationships have 
really grown because of Staff College and defence diplomacy. Soft power is really what it 
is, it’s a way of engaging without having major military exercises which confront 
people.”  Each course also conducted an international tour.  Fogarty argued this was “a 
pretty powerful tool when you turn up with fifty people in someone’s country and you 
engage at significantly high levels at times [...] it indicates you’re taking a serious 
approach to engagement with them.”129  NZDF officers also attend courses at overseas 
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defence colleges, which “contributes to strong relationships between New Zealand and 
the international community.”130   Furthermore, visits by foreign defence delegations 
“create engagement opportunities and generate good-will among the nations concerned 
and New Zealand.”131  Training cooperation also provided benefits to NZDF personnel by 
improving their understanding of the armed forces of their foreign counterparts, and their 
language, culture and political systems.
132
  
 
Another important instrument was the Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP), which is 
bilateral in nature.  MAP’s purpose is to complement efforts in the political, economic 
and development fields to encourage friendly and cooperative bilateral relationships with 
New Zealand’s near neighbours. The Programme’s Mission Statement explained: 
 
The MAP Mission Statement is to contribute in practical terms to the 
achievement of the NZDF’s mission to promote secure and stable 
neighbourhoods, through the provision of training, technical and other 
support to South Pacific and Southeast Asian security and defence forces.133 
 
Participation in MAP activities was decided on an annual basis following advice from the 
Ministry of Defence’s International Defence Relations Branch, discussed later in this 
chapter, on which countries are approved to participate.  MAP provides technical 
assistance, training, and exchange opportunities to defence forces in South East Asia and 
the South Pacific.  It originated in patterns of ‘old’ defence diplomacy; back to the 
NZDF’s earlier involvement in South East Asia and the desire to assist with securing a 
stable environment for the political, social and economic development of New Zealand’s 
security partners.  The NZDF acknowledged the character of the Programme had moved 
beyond that of client/donor context and that South East Asian countries no longer 
required much of the basic training that NZDF provided in the past.  Instead, the training 
sought by these countries was in areas where NZDF’s professionalism was highly 
regarded.
134
  MAP provides training in New Zealand, but also deploys training teams to 
provide training in specific areas as requested.  Based as it is on the principle of mutual 
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assistance, partner countries under the MAP reciprocate by offering training to NZ as 
well. 
 
Exercises 
Military exercises complement training and education by providing a means to practice 
operational skills in a controlled setting and providing collective training (that is at unit 
level). Collective training occurs with other units, jointly with other Services, and 
combined with the armed forces of other countries.
135
  Exercises traditionally occurred for 
the purposes of preparing for undertaking the use of force. For example, Five Power 
Defence Arrangements exercises practised activities like air defence, anti-submarine 
warfare and Command Post exercises.  More recently, and reflecting emerging security 
concerns, new exercises practise counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance disaster 
relief operations.  
 
The NZDF includes activities such as search and rescue, disaster relief and surveillance of 
Exclusive Economic Zones in the range of defence bilateral relationships.  This is 
significant as these are operational activities that are not often regarded as part of defence 
diplomacy as defined by other countries.  It should also be acknowledged that defence 
diplomacy is not viewed by the New Zealand as a substitute for defence spending on 
tangible military capabilities.
136
 It was rather seen as one of the means in which defence 
acts to prevent or deter conflict, and thus reduce the cost of delivering stability and 
security.  
 
New Zealand’s ‘old’ Defence Diplomacy – The Five Power Defence Arrangements 
To help put ‘new’ defence diplomacy into perspective, it is necessary to discuss the 
nature of New Zealand’s traditional defence relations or ‘old’ defence diplomacy.  The 
difference between New Zealand's defence diplomacy with traditional allies, and 
engagement with the armed forces of non-like minded states will be further explored 
through the use of three case studies; China, Viet Nam and Indonesia.  
 
Cottey and Forster characterised ‘old’ defence diplomacy as part of international 
realpolitik, balance-of-power politics and the pursuit of narrowly-defined national 
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interests.
137
  Defence cooperation and military assistance was provided to other states in 
order to counterbalance or deter enemies, maintain spheres of influence, support friendly 
regimes in suppressing domestic opponents or promote commercial interests.
 138
  New 
Zealand’s security assistance was historically directed to states in South East Asia on the 
front line of the Cold War.  In Asia, its closest defence and security partners were, and 
continue to be, Singapore and Malaysia.  In fact, both the NZDF and MFAT regarded the 
defence relationship with Singapore as the second most active after Australia.
139
  
Malaysia was not far behind. For this reason, New Zealand’s involvement in the FPDA 
provides the prime example of New Zealand’s ‘old’ defence diplomacy in action.   
 
As Cottey and Forster point out, many former British colonies chose to maintain 
extensive defence links to their former colonial power.  The FPDA grew out of the 
defence links Britain developed with the members of its Empire in the Asia Pacific. It was 
established as part of Britain’s withdrawal ‘East of Suez’, and withdrawal out of major 
military bases in Malaysia and Singapore and its commitments to the 1957 Anglo-
Malaysian Defence Agreement.  It brought together three external powers (the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) to guarantee the security of Singapore and 
Malaysia, mainly in the face of Communist aggression advancing through Indochina, but 
also Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ policy.   
 
When it was established in 1971, the FPDA had a specific security focus and acted as a 
loose military alliance.
140
 In the first ten years there was little institutional activity, and 
there were few ongoing exercises.  Invigorated by the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia and the invasion of Afghanistan, a regular series of significant exercises were 
begun in the early 1980s.
141
  By the 1990s combined and joint exercises took place in 
which land and naval forces played a greater role with air forces.
142
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Up until the mid to late 1990s the FPDA only played a peripheral role in New Zealand’s 
defence thinking; the bulk of attention prior to that was on defence relationships with the 
United States and Australia.
143
  The NZDF recently described the FPDA as “our primary 
element in defence cooperation and engagement in South East Asia.”144  What has 
explained this change, and what were the implications for New Zealand’s defence 
diplomacy?  
 
First, the strategic situation has changed since the Arrangements were established.  The 
UK, Australia and New Zealand were originally the dominant military forces in FPDA, in 
both equipment and training.  Now however, Singapore and Malaysia have highly capable 
military forces, equipped with a range of modern platforms straight from US, Russian and 
most tellingly, their own indigenous inventories, and they have the means and capacity to 
defend themselves.  The Singapore military is considered to be the most capable in South 
East Asia.
145
  In terms of the wider security environment within the region, in 1971 
ASEAN was made up of five members, but it is now a well-established and 
comprehensive regional community, amongst which there is no expectation that disputes 
will be resolved with force.
146
  Carlyle Thayer argues that the FPDA had become “the 
quiet achiever” and an important component among the multitude of multilateral 
structures making up South East Asia’s security architecture.147   The key to the FPDA’s 
longevity was that it adapted over time to provide different benefits to each of the 
participants. Since the end of the Cold War it had become a networking and confidence-
building arrangement for its own region.  
 
The FPDA also illustrates the way in which debates over who should lead between the 
foreign service and the defence establishments can potentially complicate defence 
relationships.  Throughout much of the early history of the FPDA, the New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) took the view that the FPDA was 
irrelevant; a transitional measure that had passed its usefulness.
148
  When the series of 
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significant exercises began in the 1980s, MFAT was of the view that the FPDA had little 
strategic relevance and was of questionable value.
149
  At the time, MFAT was at pains to 
present these exercises as a continuation, rather than a new development or revitalisation 
of FPDA, presumably mindful of their perception by other countries in the region.  Rolfe 
pointed out that Defence, on the other hand, valued the networking and training aspects of 
the relationship and since this time “the FPDA has been transformed into an active set of 
military networking and operational relationships from which all participants value.” 150  
Gerald Hensley, the former Secretary of Defence recalls that “…after 1989, […] there 
was more reason than ever for us to put policy weight on the FPDA and its exercises, 
because it was a remaining sign of our interest and commitment.”151   
 
For the NZDF, the FPDA also offered an alternative forum for professional military 
exchanges after the opportunity to train with United States forces was lost following the 
break in the ANZUS alliance.
152
  This change in perception was summed up by Prime 
Minister Helen Clark who said “We will maintain full participation in the FPDA because 
we believe that it is helpful for armed forces’ training and preparedness, and that the 
agreement plays an important part in Malaysia-Singapore relations.”153  A MFAT 
submission to a NZDF Maritime Patrol review in 2000 even went so far as to state “a 
reduced role for New Zealand in the FPDA would reduce our standing within the FPDA 
and with the region in general.”154 
 
At present, NZDF participation in FPDA exercises include hosting FPDA contingents on 
exercises like the annual Singapore artillery exercise and conducting combined naval and 
air force exercises in Malaysia and Singapore.  There has also been discussion about 
hosting the Singapore Air Force for exercises at Ohakea.
155
  The defence relationship has 
also broadened. A senior MFAT official described how New Zealand’s relationship with 
Singapore and Malaysia through FPDA was credited with assisting their contribution to 
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the United Nations missions in East Timor and later the International Security Assistance 
Force mission in Afghanistan: 
 
 The relationship, that people-to-people relationship, that’s been established 
through FPDA has enabled it to move into relevant areas of operation; to look 
at opportunities where we can work alongside each other on a place like 
Afghanistan because we have that experience working alongside each other in 
FPDA. [...] ...it’s that confidence in the relationship with New Zealand that has 
encouraged them...
156
 
 
Looking towards the future, the NZDF wishes to encourage more engagement with 
Singapore in multilateral forums, but it should also be noted there are also strong bilateral 
defence links between New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia.  For some time, both 
countries participated in MAP until Singapore withdrew in 2008 owing to its progress.  
There is a New Zealand-Singapore Strategic Dialogue which is managed by the Ministry 
of Defence’s International Defence Relations Branch.  A Singapore – New Zealand 
Defence Coordination Group was established in 1995, and the Malaysian equivalent 
established in 1996, in which senior defence officials oversee the future direction of each 
relationship.  They discuss policy issues relating to bilateral cooperation, explore new 
areas for cooperation and coordinate bilateral activities.  The New Zealand – Singapore 
relationship was further strengthened with the signing in 2008 of an Arrangement on 
Defence Cooperation.
157
   
 
In summary, at its most basic level the purpose of training, personnel exchanges and 
exercises within the FPDA construct remains the preparation for the use of force in order 
to counterbalance and deter enemies.  While the relationship has evolved over time, most 
recently being credited with enabling Singapore and Malaysia forces to deploy alongside 
New Zealand in Afghanistan, this development continued to reflect the original purpose 
of the Arrangements to build Singaporean and Malaysian defence capacity and enable the 
disparate forces to operate together.  
 
The NZDF’s objective of defence links with Asian FPDA partners was to build the 
capacity of their armed forces and maintain the ability to work with them on operations.  
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Having once opposed the relationship, or at least questioned its value in the 1980s, MFAT 
now recognises that the defence relationship serves wider foreign policy goals, 
reinforcing the political linkages between Malaysia and Singapore, and with and also 
between Australia, the UK and New Zealand.  In recent times FPDA has been able to 
demonstrate New Zealand’s usefulness to its other defence partners such as the United 
States and NATO by playing a large part in bringing Singapore and Malaysia into the 
international security efforts in Afghanistan.   
 
New Zealand’s ‘new’ Defence Diplomacy  
The changed strategic environment in which the FPDA found itself in also accounts for 
the rise of ‘new’ defence diplomacy; the extension of New Zealand defence cooperation 
beyond that needed for preparing for and undertaking the use of force.  Since the 1990s, 
the New Zealand military began to engage beyond traditional partners in Asia (like 
Singapore and Malaysia) and reach out to the armed forces of non-like-minded states. 
 
But what explained New Zealand’s broadened approach?  Gerald Hensley, career 
diplomat and the Secretary of Defence between 1991 and 1999, described the change in 
the following way: 
 
I think, in New Zealand, the concept of defence diplomacy is really security 
diplomacy. It well antedates the British or any other use of similar terms. It 
does so because I think that New Zealand’s foreign policy has always 
oscillated between security and trade or economic security.  Until Britain 
entered the common market [in 1973], our foreign policy was really focussed 
on security; the economics took care of themselves.  We’ve now gone to the 
other pole, where in the midst of the long peace security has ceased to be a 
concern of our diplomacy and of course the trade and economic aspects have 
dominated.  […] South East Asia was becoming of economic interest to us 
rather than of security interest, and that was a very healthy change.
158
 
 
In 1994, Don McKinnon the Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed the contribution of the 
NZDF to the development of trading relationships in Asia: 
 
…when we come to trade with countries  in the Asian region, we have to 
remember that they are not simply trading partners. They don’t see themselves 
as just that and they don’t regard us in that light either. We have to deal with 
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regional countries as a totality, including the security dimension. If we are to 
have influence in the region, if we are to have a rounded relationship with 
regional countries, we must be able to contribute – on the security side of the 
equation as well.
159
  
 
Terence O’Brien, former New Zealand diplomat and senior fellow at the Victoria 
University of Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies, explained the reason for the 
expansion of New Zealand’s defence relationships beyond those countries we considered 
as allies. 
 
 New Zealand is actually moving into new territory. For most of the 20th 
century, our international security and our international prosperity interests 
were taken care of by our relationships and alliances with major western 
countries. What’s happening  now as we are moving into the 21st century is 
that this marriage made in heaven between our economic interests and our 
security interests is actually being broken. Our economic interests now 
principally lie with countries that were not previously ones from whom we 
sought security. We have to, in my opinion, enlarge our security-type 
relationships, defence relationships with key nations in East Asia.
160
 
 
The key fact underpinning New Zealand’s ‘new’ defence diplomacy was the increased 
divergence of the country’s security and defence interests on one hand, and its trade and 
economic interests on the other.  As countries like China and others in Asia became 
increasingly significant trade partners for New Zealand, the significance of a wider range 
of relationships also grew. New Zealand’s defence relations expanded to take account not 
only of New Zealand’s traditional security arrangements, but also its economic and trade 
interests.  The NZDF also recognised that changes in the regional security architecture 
provided New Zealand with a greater opportunity to interact with Asian countries on 
security and defence issues.
161
  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine defence relations thriving 
if it weren’t for developments like the end of the Cold War, the establishment of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum as well as domestic political and social reforms. 
 
It is important to remember it was not all about trade and economics. The conflict 
prevention role of New Zealand defence diplomacy has also been recognised. According 
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to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NZDF built capacity for dialogue 
with defence counterparts in countries like China in order to deepen our defence and 
security understanding of the region and strengthen our engagement with individual 
countries.
162
  These activities were considered by MFAT to be a component of New 
Zealand’s broader diplomacy and confidence-building efforts.  Defence diplomacy 
assisted in conflict prevention by avoiding the security dilemma.  This dilemma was 
described by Jim Rolfe as one “in which the military activities of one state are seen to be 
threatening to the security of another state. If the region’s armed forces are well known to 
each other and familiar with each other’s philosophies and procedures, the reasoning 
goes, they are more likely to talk about security issues than react defensively to them.”163  
 
Looking at the management of defence diplomacy for a moment, the importance of 
defence relations for the New Zealand defence establishment was reflected in the fact that 
the International Defence Relations (IDR) Branch was a jointly-funded strategic level 
capability shared by the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF.
164
   
 
The role of IDR was to contribute policy advice integral to the ‘NZ Inc’ network.  ‘NZ 
Inc’ was a set of strategies designed to deliver improved strategic planning, coordination 
and efficiency among New Zealand government agencies.  IDR assisted by providing 
policy advice to the Chief of Defence Force and the Secretary of Defence on 
deployments, defence relations with overseas partners and participation in multilateral 
security forums.   
 
IDR was established in 2000 in order to rectify a policy gap between NZDF and MoD.
165
  
Some friction continues within IDR between NZDF, which focuses on current and near 
term operational matters, and the MoD, which looks more toward longer-term capability, 
other government agencies and foreign policy.  According to the NZDF, this friction 
created gaps in understanding, priorities, resourcing and the rate of effort between the two 
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organisations.
166
  The Ministry however, supplied the bulk of the staff
167
 and, at the time 
of writing, there were no NZDF staff remaining in the Branch.
168
   
 
Within the NZDF and following criticism that the informal and ad hoc advice hitherto 
provided was of limited use, a Defence International Engagement Framework was 
instituted to provide policy and guidance to decide the focus and amount of effort 
expended and in which countries.
169
  The Framework set annual priorities for NZ's 
security partnerships with other nations and, according to the NZDF, was aligned with 
New Zealand’s foreign policy objectives.170   
 
Multilateral cooperation 
One interesting corollary of ‘new’ defence diplomacy was the rise of multilateral defence 
diplomacy.  The growing range of regional multilateral forums became one of the 
significant ways in which New Zealand engaged with non-like-minded partners.  The 
proliferation of multilateral defence dialogues in the region, such as the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+), the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting 
Plus Eight (ADSOM+), the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Jakarta International Defence 
Dialogue, and most recently, the Seoul Defence Dialogue, was ascribed to the need for 
collective capabilities and multinational efforts to deal with diverse and rapidly changing 
security threats.
171
  
 
Multilateral defence diplomacy offered an acceptable alternative to more traditional 
alliance arrangements as they appealed to the reluctance of Asian nations to become 
involved in formal security relationships.  Viet Nam for example, explicitly refused to 
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enter into any alliance, but that did not prevent it from undertaking defence diplomacy.
172
  
Likewise, Indonesia has been traditionally reluctant to enter into alliance arrangements 
and sensitivities about Indonesian domestic opinion on the issue was a frequent factor that 
limited aspects of New Zealand’s defence relations with Indonesia, such as visits and 
exercises.
173
  China has a long-standing policy of non-alignment as part of its independent 
and self-reliant foreign policy of peace,
174
 yet has pursued an active military diplomacy 
programme since the 1990s. 
 
Asian nations also tended to favour bilateral relationships. Even within multilateral 
settings, government officials from Asian nations undertook many short bilateral 
meetings, several in order to conclude formal agreements,
175
 while wider multilateral 
discourse resulted in non-legally binding declarations and statements.
176
   Laksmana 
insisted that multilateral defence diplomacy in South East Asia had to be viewed together 
with bilateral defence relations. He viewed them as two sides of the same coin; with 
bilateral relationships being primarily concerned with specific state defence issues, while 
multilateral relationships were aimed more at balancing the influence of the major 
powers.  He further differentiated them by arguing that bilateral links were regarded as 
better suited to the discussion of ‘hard’ defence issues, while multilateralism tended to be 
the venue for discussion of ‘less-significant’ non-traditional security issues.177 Despite the 
rise of multilateral forums, bilateral relationships with South East Asian states remained a 
crucial part of the regional security architecture.  For example, while ADMM is intended 
to strengthen defence and security cooperation by providing a platform for open and 
constructive dialogue and to promote practical cooperation among the armed forces of 
ASEAN members, participants cannot discuss strategic-level issues at the highest level, 
because these are beyond the ministerial prerogative of defence ministers.
178
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The network of bilateral defence relationships in South East Asia is extensive. As early as 
1989, Indonesian General Try Sutrisno characterised the number of bilateral defence 
linkages between ASEAN states as “like a spider web”.179    Bilateral activities, which 
often entail military exercises, tend to be more expensive and some nations are reluctant 
to conduct bilateral defence cooperation for this reason.  New Zealand officials have 
found multilateral activities, on the other hand, more accessible as they were likely to 
only require the dispatch of a small delegation of officials or a single military platform for 
a limited time. New Zealand does not have a preference either way, but multilateral 
activities have a number of advantages for small militaries.   Dr Wayne Mapp, former 
Defence Minister observed that “the great advantage was that they brought everyone 
together so you could get round everyone fairly quickly, so that’s pretty important. It 
made you think of the issues that affected the region as a whole.”180  Former Secretary of 
Defence John McKinnon commented that “if you had to choose between participating in 
a multilateral exercise and a bilateral one, you might opt for the multilateral [exercise] 
because you literally get a bigger bang for your buck.”181  However, he also noted “if you 
are doing a multilateral thing in the region, what you try to do is clip on bilateral 
activities. […] The multilateral activity might give you more reach but it may be less 
useful militarily than a bilateral activity.  It might have more of a diplomatic point than a 
military point.”182  New Zealand recognises the different roles each of these multilateral 
institution plays in the regional security architecture. As a senior MFAT official 
explained when talking about ADMM+: 
 
 It filled a gap in some of the other regional organisations that focus on those 
sorts of issues. You had the likes of the Shangri La Dialogue, which is a policy 
dialogue; the ASEAN Regional Forum which is quite limited by some of the 
dynamics. It was meant to be the mechanism for preventative diplomacy and 
it’s never really fulfilled that potential because there’s too many brakes placed 
on it by various players. So to have something like the ADMM+, which has 
policy dialogue but also engages the military around practical themes is an 
extremely useful piece of confidence-building. It is quite solutions-focused 
too.
183
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Issues and Dilemmas of New Zealand’s Defence Diplomacy.  
From this chapter and the one preceding it, it is apparent that the conduct of defence 
diplomacy created issues and posed a number of dilemmas. Issues often encountered in 
the conduct of defence diplomacy included the amount of reciprocal activity and 
openness that needs to be provided or should be expected from such new defence 
partners, and how competing interests between support for democracy and the 
development of good civil-military relations are balanced.  Conducting defence 
diplomacy also requires the armed forces themselves to reconcile what was hitherto 
considered their core role in preparing for conflict with how far they should engage 
potential adversaries and its possibility of compromising the former.  Partners in defence 
diplomacy often have different motivations and purposes in mind, and differences in 
these perspectives also had the ability to create tensions within relationships.  There is 
also the recent burgeoning in multilateral engagement between defence establishments, 
and what this means for bilateral engagement, to consider.  This section seeks to explore 
some of these issues from New Zealand’s perspective.  
 
Balancing cooperation between ‘old’ and ‘new’  
Cottey and Forster recognised that ‘new’ defence diplomacy existed alongside ‘old’, and 
there are tensions between them.  Efforts to strengthen the military capabilities of allies 
created problems in strategic engagement with former foes, while strategic engagement 
with these former foes potentially risked undermining the ability to defend allies against 
these states.
184
  Perhaps the very first of these dilemmas is the question of whether it is 
right or prudent to engage a former or potential enemy, particularly in the military arena 
where engagement requires transparency and openness.  Such questions are not new.
185
   
For example, during a visit to the United States by Chinese Chief of Staff General Chen 
Bingde, United States lawmakers objected to their Chinese guests being able to view 
advanced military technology.
186
  These objections arose from a perspective that defence 
diplomacy activities provide a means of improving the military capabilities of states.  
Indeed, the Chinese (and many others) describe one of the purposes of their defence 
relations as improving their military capabilities.  But perspectives that non-like-minded 
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countries like China are “…not allied or even friendly...”187 will continue to vex the 
conduct of defence diplomacy.   
 
Another objection to defence diplomacy is that it might distract the armed forces from 
their core business of preparing to fight wars. From informal conversations with NZDF 
personnel and reading New Zealand military doctrine, defence engagement with a range 
of other countries, including non-like-minded states is a key role of the Defence Force 
and is pursued as a conflict prevention objective.  On this subject, former Secretary 
Defence John McKinnon explains: 
 
Defence diplomacy is an outflow of defence core business. […] Establishing 
and maintaining channels of communication with other militaries – 
understanding what other militaries are about – is a very important part of 
figuring out what you as a military yourself are doing. It’s not a distraction; it’s 
an input into that core business.
188
 
 
This is not the only way in which tensions arose between ‘old’ and ‘new’ defence 
diplomacy.  New relationships with former and potential adversaries have to be carefully 
managed to make sure they do not interfere with or complicate traditional relationships 
between allies, about what information, training and capabilities were being shared for 
example.  Two key examples are the FPDA and its impact on defence diplomacy with 
Indonesia, or defence links with China and their impact on traditional links with Australia 
and the United States.  Paul Sinclair noted that New Zealand is “very careful to manage 
the newer relationships in a way that does not impinge or limit our ability to conduct our 
relationships with long-standing partners, be they five-eyes partners or Five Power 
Defence Arrangements partners.”189  John McKinnon added that “...it is inherent in the 
nature of this business that you are managing relationships with a variety of partners. The 
skill is to do this in a way which allows you maximum ability to do so.”190 
 
Bureaucratic rivalry and primacy 
Institutional primacy relates to the question of whether it should it be the diplomats or the 
military who decide the focus of defence diplomatic efforts.  Furthermore, there may be 
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rivalry between the defence establishment and the foreign service, about who sets the 
policy direction of cooperative activities carried out by the armed forces, such as where 
and how much defence cooperation with certain states is appropriate.  This was more 
significant in cases where the nation being engaged was a military regime or where the 
foreign ministry’s diplomatic corps either lacked access or had been downsized.  Such 
matters also give rise to questions over civilian oversight of the military’s activities.  
Conversely, as defence becomes conflated within “all of government” (commonly known 
in New Zealand as “NZ Inc”) approaches to other countries, there is also the danger of 
institutional convergence particularly where there was a large security and defence 
element in the relationship.  
 
In New Zealand’s case, this does not seem to be a significant issue. There is broad 
acceptance within Defence of the notion that defence is a sub-set of foreign policy, while 
the small size of New Zealand’s bureaucratic system meant that issues tended to be 
coordinated between a variety of agencies anyway.  As former Ambassador Tony Browne 
pointed out; “this is not an issue in New Zealand. Defence would never claim primacy in 
determining the nature of a political relationship. There are times where [...] the extent to 
which there is defence input into key decision-making goes up and down...”191  Defence 
and foreign affairs officials agreed that defence would coordinate the ‘nuts and bolts’ or 
day-to-day aspects of relationships, while high level direction and policy would be 
decided at the interagency level, likely involving not only defence and foreign affairs, but 
also other interested agencies such as the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  
There were no reservations from foreign affairs officials about the role the defence force 
was building with these new partners.  For example, on the Chinese defence relationship 
Tony Browne commented, “we too see the relationship with China as something that 
benefits from having a broad base, not a narrow base.”192  Primacy concerns not only who 
provides the policy direction, but also raises another issue of the militarisation of foreign 
policy.  This was a particular concern where the military was being used as the de facto 
diplomatic representation.  Again, foreign affairs officials welcomed the addition of 
defence ties into the range of diplomatic relations, one official admitting “I think defence 
establishments moving into this soft diplomacy space is a good move, I don’t think 
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[primacy] is a problem for New Zealand defence but in defence establishments like Viet 
Nam it is easy to see a military solution to everything.”193 
 
Conditionality 
The imposition of conditions on defence relations can have a significant impact on their 
conduct. For example, the military relationship between the United States and China has 
not evolved past the discussion of broad strategic issues despite military cooperation 
dating back to the 1980s, due to conditions being applied by both sides, which has 
resulted in impediments to and, in some cases, suspension of military engagement.
194
  
New Zealand does not apply conditions to its broader diplomatic relationships. Speaking 
about relations with one party states, a senior foreign affairs official explained: 
 
 ...in my opinion, within the New Zealand political system there was much more 
of a sense that you deal with people across the board and you don’t have to 
wait until countries become democratic.
195
 
 
In New Zealand’s case, defence relations with Indonesia provide the best example of 
conditionality, but other recent examples include Thailand and Fiji which have had 
defence cooperation cut due to New Zealand’s concerns over their armed forces’ role in 
domestic politics.  Another aspect of conditionality is the dilemma posed by cooperating 
with authoritarian regimes.  Visits and exchanges between defence forces are often 
credited with assisting in the development of norms of behaviour, like good civil-military 
relations for example, in those forces being engaged.  A dilemma is posed by the choice 
between cooperating with an authoritarian regime to promote democracy, civil-military 
relations and respect for human rights and face criticism that the engagement is not 
working (that is, not improving democracy, civil-military relations or the human rights 
situation), or alternatively, cut defence cooperation and lose what little influence there 
might have been over the regime. This dilemma is particularly acute when the regime in 
question is a military dictatorship or where the military has a particularly close 
relationship to the ruling party in political power.  In New Zealand’s case, the defence 
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relationship with Indonesia from 1974 onwards is the prime demonstration of how this 
dilemma plays out.   
 
Reciprocity 
Cottey and Forster identified reciprocity as another dilemma that often emerged in the 
conduct of defence diplomacy; the question of whether defence diplomacy should be 
mutual.  Where it is not, problems occur when one state is perceived to concede more 
than others, as is the case between the United States and China,
196
 or where transparency 
may be vulnerable to abuse, as regular allegations of spying attest.
197
  In order for defence 
diplomacy to work, a balance must be found between reassurance and transparency on 
one hand, and developing reciprocity on the other.  China used military diplomacy to 
reassure selected countries; enhance China’s image as a responsible member of the 
international community; gain access to foreign military technology and expertise; and 
deter threats to stability by demonstrating the PLA’s improving capabilities.198  The 
inclusion of the last one is of significance to the issue of reciprocity; because this was an 
accusation often levelled at United States military diplomacy efforts by China, and was 
used as a reason for China not reciprocating in military exchanges.
199
   
 
One means of getting around this issue has been to focus defence diplomacy activities on 
less contentious areas such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief; all areas where the need to access and share high-
technology military capabilities are minimal.  Many defence diplomacy activities around 
the world have been initiated in such areas where both parties are comfortable to operate. 
Dr Wayne Mapp, the New Zealand Defence Minister, provided another reason for 
regional militaries to cooperate in disaster relief in a speech to the 2010 Shangri-La 
Dialogue.   
 
International assistance does involve questions of sovereignty and international 
jurisdiction. We must, therefore, ensure that all parties are comfortable with the 
means for delivery.  [...] One of the key challenges for defence forces used to 
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training for combat is building a better understanding of relief operations. This 
means giving confidence to recipient countries that the defence presence from 
other countries does not infringe the sovereignty of states.
200
 
 
The NZDF has held search and rescue exercises with the People’s Liberation Army 
(Navy) which took place within a New Zealand and Australian combined maritime war 
fighting exercise.
201
 
 
In a twist on defence diplomacy, the concept of disaster diplomacy was coined to 
describe the potential for the use of military assets for humanitarian objectives to 
institutionalise a framework for military to military engagement between enemies or 
where there is little tradition of multilateral security cooperation.
202
 Others have 
suggested environmental cooperation, in areas such as energy use, responses to climate 
change and disaster relief for example, as an appropriate and a productive avenue for 
military cooperation.
203
   
 
Another way to get around reciprocity is to engage other defence forces in multilateral 
defence diplomacy.  In a multilateral forum, all parties can expect to receive roughly the 
same amount of benefit in aggregate over a period of time, and specific reciprocity 
becomes less of an issue.
204
   
 
Clash of purposes 
Problems have arisen when countries view the defence diplomacy activities of others with 
suspicion. China and the United States for example readily acknowledged that each 
country had a "difference in philosophy" on what military-to-military relations entailed 
and that there were problems with trust.
205
   Because China viewed their foreign military 
relations as a means to develop friendly relations with other nations and modernise their 
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military, some countries (particularly the United States and certain elements within it) 
saw this as a means for China to acquire military hardware and technology, to expand 
their military presence, and to intimidate its neighbours.   
 
For New Zealand, issues about access and release of information prejudicial to security 
seem to have been less of a consideration.  The NZDF operates technology, such as 
tactical radios and thermal sights supplied primarily by the United States as a result of an 
extensive and ongoing programme of reshaping and rebuilding military capabilities over 
the last decade.  In addition the NZDF utilises doctrine and tactics that are not intended to 
be disclosed beyond its traditional defence partners.  Such equipment and procedures 
were supplied on the proviso they are kept safe from third parties.  This was 
straightforward for the NZDF to achieve as such defence articles were few and far 
between and easily contained in secure areas.  The NZDF Command and Staff College, 
who taught a number of students from countries including Viet Nam and China,
206
 did 
close sessions to these students, but actively sought to limit the need to do so.
207
 
 
Conclusion  
The FPDA provides an example of New Zealand’s traditional defence relationships or 
‘old’ defence diplomacy.  It is characterised as such by its links with key allies for the 
purpose of enhancing military capability towards building interoperability between the 
partner forces. 
 
However, noting the way in which New Zealand’s FPDA partners have developed over 
the last forty years and in light of comments from MFAT officials, it is readily apparent 
that what was once an ‘old’ defence relationship with the FPDA countries has morphed 
into a form of ‘new’ defence diplomacy, in that it is conducted for both broader political 
and economic purposes and for military purposes.  As a result, despite its initial rationale 
having faded over time, the FPDA continues to exist as a strongly supported and active 
set of relationships.  It has evolved over time to overlap and complement with, rather than 
compete with or replace traditional bilateral alliances or ASEAN multilateralism.   
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Having reviewed New Zealand’s ‘old’ defence diplomacy and the range of new 
relationships, it is appropriate to look more intently at New Zealand’s defence 
cooperation with some of these key new partners.  The NZDF’s newer relationships, with 
countries like China, Viet Nam and the renewed relationship with Indonesia, provide 
examples to explore the way in which defence ties evolve, and serve to illustrate how the 
key issues raised by Cottey and Forster and other commentators on the concept play out 
in New Zealand’s experience. 
 
 
 
   59 
 
 
 
Chapter Four New Zealand’s defence relations with the People’s 
Republic of China 
 
Introduction 
One of the most extraordinary events in international relations of the last two decades has 
been the economic rise of China and it’s far reaching effects.  Some readers may ask why, 
in this day and age, China is discussed in this paper as a former or potential enemy.  
Indeed, there is a great deal of sensitivity about discussing China from a security 
perspective in New Zealand.  New Zealand and China fought as belligerents in the 
Korean War, in which New Zealand artillery provided support to the British 
Commonwealth Brigades during the battles of Maryang San, Kapyong and the Samichon 
River against the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.  After the Korean War, when New 
Zealand entered into the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) alliance in 
1954, it was in response to the threat posed by China.
208
   SEATO lasted until 1972, 
following US-Chinese rapprochement and the year in which New Zealand first 
recognised the People’s Republic as the legitimate government of China.209 
 
Despite the granting of diplomatic recognition, New Zealand opinions of China continued 
to be considerably influenced by the perception of friendly South East Asian 
governments, which felt themselves under the continued threat from Chinese Communist 
subversion.
210
   These included our closest allies Singapore and Malaysia, and also 
Indonesia.  As military historian Peter Cooke argues, “as a communist country and a 
country that provided military support to North Vietnam [...] China was seen, in a Cold 
War context, as being a potential enemy.”211  Further development of New Zealand’s 
relationship was able to take place as reforms initiated within China under the rule of 
Deng Xiaoping led China to develop a market economy and a less ideological and more 
pragmatic political approach, which opened China up to the world.  Relations developed 
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slowly, but accelerated over time and the relationship with China is one of New Zealand’s 
most important bilateral partnerships.
212
   Foreign policy talks, together with economic 
and trade talks, are held regularly.  More members of the Communist Party central 
committee visited New Zealand in the past decade than almost any other country.
213
 New 
Zealand and China signed a free trade agreement in April 2008. There is regular contact 
on a wide range of issues including law and governance, human rights, international 
fisheries management, agriculture, dairy, forestry and developmental assistance as well as 
regional security and defence.  Helen Clark, the New Zealand Prime Minister between 
1999 and 2008, herself stated “it can be deduced from this interaction and dialogue that 
our Government does not see China as a threat.”214 
 
Nevertheless, despite espousing an “independent foreign policy of peace”215 and the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for over two decades, the occasionally heated rhetoric 
and actions of the Chinese government coupled with its lack of transparency continues to 
complicate attempts to understand China’s approach to international relations.   
 
China’s seeming willingness to use force in territorial disputes with its neighbours and the 
development of Chinese advanced military capabilities have added to this uncertainty.   
As a result, the China threat debate continues to dominate much of Western strategic 
thought.   There have been questions raised in New Zealand over China’s behaviour; for 
instance, despite Helen Clarke’s assertion, China has been behind cyber attacks on New 
Zealand government agencies.
216
  
 
There is not a great deal of official comment about the New Zealand-China defence 
relationship.  Ayson pointed out that New Zealand’s defence policy is reluctant to go into 
much detail at all about China.
217
   China was briefly described as one of the “pivotal” 
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major powers in East Asia on whose actions rest regional peace and security.
218
   
However, our closest security partners were not as reticent, with Australia acknowledging 
the potential for the pace, structure and scope of China’s military modernisation to give 
its neighbours cause for concern and create questions over its long-term strategic 
purpose.
219
  As former Secretary of Defence John McKinnon observed “China is a major 
power in the region. It has significant military assets. It has a variety of national 
objectives. Some of these obviously impinge on us, either regionally or more broadly. 
Therefore, from our point of view, understanding what is motivating or driving the 
Chinese is important.”220  One means to gain that understanding has been a formal 
defence relationship with the People’s Republic of China since 1998.   
 
The development of Sino - New Zealand Defence Diplomacy  
It was not until 1979, when China introduced its policy of opening up to the outside 
world, that military exchanges with other countries grew substantially.
221
  The increasing 
frequency and sophistication of China’s defence diplomacy mirrored China’s wider 
engagement in the international community.
222
  Between 1987 and 1999, the number of 
Chinese defence attaché offices abroad had increased from 60 to 99, while the number of 
foreign missions in China increased from 40 to 65.
223
   The PLA was considered as an 
important ‘new’ actor in Chinese foreign policy due to its continued professionalisation 
and its increasing contacts and cooperation with the outside world.
224
  Most significant 
was the recognition that the PLA’s mind-set appeared to be developing along a dual-track 
trajectory: one track that was more nationalistic and another that was more willing to 
engage in international cooperation and dialogue.
225
   
 
The first peacetime military contact between China and New Zealand took the form of a 
goodwill visit by two Royal New Zealand Navy frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and 
Southland, to Shanghai during a regional deployment in 1987.  At the time New Zealand 
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Prime Minister David Lange described the visit as adding another strand to the 
relationship between the two countries, and noted that it reflected “the importance which 
we attach to building on the base of familiarity and goodwill that has grown up between 
New Zealand and China, a country of very great political and economic weight in our 
region.”226 This sentiment became a familiar theme.  
 
New Zealand’s formal military relationship with the People’s Republic of China dates 
back to 1998, when New Zealand and China each established resident defence attachés in 
Beijing and Wellington respectively.  But it was two successive high-level exchanges that 
paved the way toward this watershed in the relationship. The first, in May 1996, saw PLA 
Deputy Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai visit New Zealand.  
He met with senior Cabinet Ministers and held talks with Gerald Hensley, Secretary of 
Defence and Lieutenant General Anthony Birks, Chief of Defence Force.  Xiong usually 
made brief visits of one or two days duration, met only with senior military leaders and 
only on rare occasions gave speeches at defence universities.
227
  On this occasion General 
Xiong delivered a presentation at Victoria University, in which he espoused China’s 
defence policy,
228
 a similar theme to his meeting with senior defence officials.
229
  General 
Xiong was the driving force behind the expansion of the PLA’s defence diplomacy efforts 
over the course of the 1990s and was the next most important person in the PLA’s foreign 
relations programme beside the Defence Minister.
230
  He was responsible for initial 
approval of the PLA’s foreign relations programme and could sign off on functional-level 
exchanges with other countries.
231
   At the time New Zealand defence relations were 
established, Xiong was new into his post.   
 
The second exchange saw the New Zealand Secretary for Defence, Gerald Hensley, visit 
China, where the two sides agreed to further strengthen the high-level strategic dialogue 
and exchange resident Defence Attachés.  
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These early exchanges likely came about after mutual military contacts on the fringes of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, first held in 1994.
232
  At the time, New Zealand 
was an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, while China was a Consultative Partner.  Chris Elder, 
the New Zealand Ambassador to China at the time, confided that a Chinese delegate once 
told him “the greatest dividend of the ASEAN Regional Forum was getting the PLA out 
of China to see the real world.”233  
 
Opportunity knocked when a senior Chinese General transited through New Zealand in 
May 1995. Gerald Hensley, the Secretary of Defence at the time, explained that: 
 
It was the first high-level passage through New Zealand. [...] I thought this was 
an opportunity we mustn’t miss. So I went up to Auckland [...] and essentially 
made clear to him that we were interested in increasing our defence 
relationship in modest useful ways.  This fell on fruitful ears and was followed-
up by General Xiong’s visit a year or two later.234 
 
The Chinese General on his way through Auckland to South America was Xu Huizi, 
Deputy Chief of General Staff.
235
  Xu was heavily involved in defence diplomacy 
activities
236
 and, notably, was a Korean War veteran.
237
  Thus it was in this manner that 
New Zealand initiated the Sino-New Zealand defence relationship. 
 
The purpose of Sino – New Zealand Defence Diplomacy 
Defence and foreign affairs officials in New Zealand both agreed that the Chinese (as 
well as many other Asian countries) simply regard a defence and security relationship as a 
component of a well-rounded wider relationship.
238
  Former Ambassador to China and 
Secretary of Defence John McKinnon observed: 
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 The military are an important part of China. Therefore from New Zealand’s 
broader political and strategic objectives, understanding the Chinese military is 
important and defence links are the way you do that. By connecting with them 
directly you have to do that through defence channels. It is a component of that 
broader relationship; it’s not by any means the most important part of it but it’s 
one that we’ve wanted to nurture.239 
 
Regarding New Zealand’s gains however, it was easy to overemphasise the value of the 
defence engagement in terms of the benefits to the wider relationship.  While the Defence 
IDR Branch argued that our defence links gave us access to the higher echelons of the 
Chinese Politburo during free trade negotiations,
240
 the Ambassador to China at the time 
saw the defence relationship as more of a “tick in the box” and it was a stretch to think 
the defence relationship contributed materially to the free trade agreement.  As he 
explained: 
 
 China’s decision to engage in a free trade agreement is a highly political decision; it 
wasn’t one that was driven by economic calculations. ...in making that decision to 
get into that negotiation China was making a statement about how it viewed the 
broader relationship with New Zealand.
241
 
 
From China’s perspective, in the beginning, as Gerald Hensley explained: 
 
 [China] wanted to show it was not a threat, it did not intend to be an aggressive 
power, that everyone who was a bit nervous about the rapidity of their rise 
could relax.  They chose New Zealand because we’re so small that it didn’t 
raise any awkward questions.  As with the free trade agreement, if they could 
demonstrate the ability to comfortably manage a relationship with a small 
country like New Zealand, then other countries would think “they can manage 
us.”242 
 
The Australian Department of Defence Secretary was invited to China soon after Gerald 
Hensley visited in 1997.  It was surmised that the Chinese thought it was best to start with 
New Zealand which “carried less alliance and other baggage.”243  New Zealand was 
attractive to the Chinese as a diplomatic misstep would have few consequences, as 
opposed to one with the United States for example.  It was also likely to be in New 
Zealand's wider trade interests to overlook such missteps if they were ever to occur. 
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When pressed for specific benefits that China achieves from a defence relationship with 
New Zealand, defence officials pointed to New Zealand’s expertise, capabilities and 
professionalism.  As Paul Sinclair, the Head of the Ministry of Defence’s International 
Defence Relations Branch explained: 
 
 ...[the Chinese] are amazed and take close interest in how we manage to do so 
much with so little. This comes up at almost every meeting: how we manage so 
many deployments with such a small force; how economical we are; how we 
manage with so little funding. They see us as a Western force that is friendly 
and engaged and has procedures and processes that might well be useful for 
them to adopt.
244
 
 
In contrast, both the PLA and China’s civilian leadership regarded defence diplomacy 
activities as political undertakings using military means for strategic reasons, rather than 
as a freestanding set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for 
explicitly military reasons.
245
 As a former senior MFAT official made clear: 
 
 There are times that people try and divine a value for China that goes beyond 
that and talk about things like tapping into our expertise in peacekeeping and 
so on. You don’t discount it, but you have to be very careful not to 
overemphasise it. China doesn’t have a defence and security relationship with 
New Zealand in order to learn from New Zealand. That’s not what it’s about. If 
they are going to have a relationship with New Zealand they want to have a 
defence component of it.
246
 
 
Sino – New Zealand Defence Diplomacy in Practice 
Since exchanging resident defence attachés, China and New Zealand have established 
mechanisms for regular or irregular consultations on the issues of security, defence and 
arms control.  These include holding annual defence dialogues; bilateral and multilateral 
committees and working groups to enhance interoperability and implement agreements 
and arrangements; agreements and arrangements for mutual support; exercises between 
each nation’s armed forces (e.g. the Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise held in 
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the Tasman Sea early October 2007
247
); exchanges of personnel; and mutual participation 
in training courses and Staff Colleges.  The PLA’s defence diplomacy activities can be 
grouped into four broad categories that include strategic-level activities; functional and 
professional military education exchanges; port calls, and multilateral cooperation. 
 
Strategic exchanges 
Strategic-level activities involve the use of defence diplomacy to shape the international 
security environment to support Beijing’s national defence objectives.  The PLA has three 
basic ways in which it does this: high-level defence consultations and dialogues with key 
global actors, exchanges between high-level military delegations, and arms transfers.   
 
The NZDF and the PLA have engaged in high-level defence consultations and dialogues 
and have enjoyed exchanges between high-level military delegations.  Exchanges 
between New Zealand and Chinese high-level military delegations have occurred since 
1996.  Strategic dialogues between China and New Zealand have been a recent 
development, with the first such meeting occurring in August 2011.  According to John 
McKinnon, the PLA were “very keen about systemising and structuring relationships. [...] 
We as a country are not quite so focussed on the formality but we are happy to respond to 
that.”248   
 
Within strategic level meetings, New Zealand and Chinese defence leaders explored new 
ways for practical military cooperation and exchanged views on international and 
regional security.  As Paul Sinclair explained: 
 
There is always a discussion of global and regional security interests, of 
transnational or non-conventional security challenges. So for instance with the 
PLA: counter-piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the other key element 
in all those talks of course is the shape of the bilateral relationship and the 
future of defence engagement. So they tend to be fairly standard in terms of 
content.
249
 
 
These meetings invariably end with a pledge to further or enhance military cooperation, 
not only in personnel exchanges and education, but also to reinforce communication and 
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coordination within multilateral security institutions.  Often this is said to “boost the 
relationship to new highs” or some variation on those same words.250  The Chinese see 
frequent high-level contacts as evidence of the two countries maintaining good 
momentum in relations.  John McKinnon explained that the content of such meetings 
would vary: 
 
 We’ve certainly had exchanges which have been quite full and reasonably 
frank with countries like China and Viet Nam where you might expect there to 
be some reticence. We’ve had other exchanges with other countries which you 
could say was fairly banal, perhaps not very revelatory. Sometimes that 
depends on the personalities; it may not be related to the particular country’s 
perspective on New Zealand, it’s just the way that person on the other side of 
the table might want to operate. Sometimes it is just contingent on what events 
have occurred in the previous year, or have not occurred – the ‘thermometer 
factor’ in the dialogue.251 
 
High-level military exchanges between China and New Zealand since 1996 are listed in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: High-Level Defence Exchanges between China and New Zealand since 1996 
Date Delegation 
May 1996 Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai to New Zealand. 
 
April 1997 Gerald Hensley, the Secretary of Defence to China. 
 
February  1998 Chi Haotian, the Chinese Minister of Defence and vice Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, to New Zealand.
252
 
 
August 1998 Max Bradford, Minister of Defence to China. 
 
November 1999 General Yu Yongbo, Director of PLA General Political Department to New 
Zealand. 
 
December 1999 Major General Maurice Dodson, Chief of General Staff to China. Met with 
Chi Haotian. 
 
March 2000 Lt General Liu Shunshun, Commander of PLAAF to New Zealand. 
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Date Delegation 
October 2000 Air Marshal Carey Adamson, Chief of Defence Force to China. Met with Chi 
Haotian, Minster of Defence and vice Chairman of Central Military 
Commission. 
 
November 2000 General Yuan Shoufang, Deputy Director of the PLA General Political 
Department to New Zealand.  
 
28 March-11 April 2001 General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission 
to New Zealand. Met with PM, Foreign Affairs Minster, acting Minister of 
Defence, CDF and Secretary of Defence. 
 
September 2001 Graham Fortune, Secretary of Defence to China. Met with General Zhang 
Wannian and General Xiong Guangkai. 
 
22-28 September 2001 Air Vice Marshal John Hamilton, Chief of Air Force, to China 
 
4-7 November 2001 Mark Burton, Minister of Defence to China. Met with General Chi Haotian, 
Defence Minister and General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission. 
 
April 2002 Deputy Chief of General Staff to New Zealand.  
 
22-28 May 2005 David Bamfield, Vice Chief of Defence Force to China. 
 
5-20 September 2005 Zhang Qinsheng Deputy Chief of General Staff to New Zealand. 
 
?-21 September 2006 Xu Caihou, vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to New 
Zealand. Met with PM Minister of Defence, CDF and the acting Secretary of 
Defence. 
 
8-14 October 2006 Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae, Chief of Defence Force to China. 
 
10-13 November 2006 Phil Goff, the Minister of Defence to China. 
 
2007 1st bilateral Strategic Dialogue 
 
28 June – 6 July 2008 Major General Lou Gardiner, Chief of Army to China 
 
24- 29 November 2008 Major General Ma Zhongsheng, Ministry of National Defence Foreign 
Affairs Office to New Zealand.  
 
12-16 March 2009 Major General Ma Xiaotian to New Zealand (for 2nd bilateral Strategic 
Dialogue) 
 
20 March 2009 Lieutenant General Yand Dongming (PLAAF) to New Zealand.  
 
18-27 April 2009 NZDF Maritime Component Commander to China (for PLAN 60th 
Anniversary). 
 
22-24 September 2009 NZ Defence Minister Wayne Mapp to China. Met with Liang Guanglie, 
Defence Minister.  
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Date Delegation 
5-10 November 2009 Air Vice Marshal Graham Lintott to China (for PLAAF 60th Anniversary). 
 
16-19 May 2010 Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to New 
Zealand.  
 
31 May – 3 June 2010 Vice Chief of Defence Force, Rear Admiral Jack Steer to China. Met Ma 
Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff PLA. (3
rd
 bilateral Strategic 
Dialogue).  
 
August 2010 John McKinnon, Secretary of Defence to China. 
 
September 2010 Gen Li Jinai, Director General of the PLA General Political Department to 
New Zealand. 
 
Rear Admiral Leng Zhenqing, Deputy Chief of Staff PLAN to New Zealand 
(during port call).   
 
October 2010 Minister of Defence Wayne Mapp to China (in his capacity as Science 
Minister). 
 
21-25 November 2010 Lieutenant General Chen Yong, Assistant Chief of General Staff to New 
Zealand.  
 
September 2011 General Hou Shusen, Deputy Chief of General Staff, to New Zealand 
 
September 2011 Lieutenant General Rhys Jones, CDF to Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai. 
 
November 2011 Rear Admiral Jack Steer to China. Met General Ma Xiaotian (during 4
th
 
bilateral Strategic Dialogue). 
 
April 2012 Lieutenant General Qi Jiangou, Assistant Chief of General Staff, to New 
Zealand  
 
November 2012 Rear Admiral Jack Steer, Chief of Navy, to China. Met with Qi Jianguo 
(during NZDF Staff College visit). 
 
16-20 December 2012 Major General Tim Keating, Vice Chief of Defence, to China. Met Lieutenant 
General Qi Jianguo and Liang Guanglie (5
th
 bilateral Strategic Dialogue). 
 
 
There are also opportunities for high-level meetings on the margins of multilateral 
meetings. New Zealand Defence Minister Wayne Mapp met with his Chinese counterpart 
Lian Guanglie at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue.
253
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Functional and educational exchanges 
Like many other armed forces, including New Zealand’s, the PLA increasingly took on a 
wide spectrum of tasks, including traditional military roles as well as non-traditional ones.  
Like other militaries, while assuming these new roles, the PLA also transformed itself 
from a large-scale force into one that is smaller, more efficient and technically-
proficient.
254
  Functional and educational exchanges provided PLA officers with first-
hand knowledge of foreign militaries that informed decisions about PLA modernisation 
efforts.  Personnel exchanges led to greater knowledge of the other nation's systems and 
greater understanding of its military and social culture.  
 
Since 2001 New Zealand received several visits from lower ranking PLA officers from 
PLA units (such as the Second Artillery Force, the Informationisation
255
 Committee, Oil 
and Quartermaster Department and the Infrastructure and Barracks Department), regional 
commands (such as Guangzhou Military Area) and defence educational institutions 
(including the PLA Artillery College, the Xi’an Political College and the National 
Defence University).   During these visits, delegations met their NZDF equivalents to 
discuss “organisational and capability development.”256  Visits by the commander of the 
PLA Guangzhou Military Region and the PLAN East Sea fleet to New Zealand (see the 
section on port calls below) were part of a marked change from previous practice in PLA 
defence diplomacy in which only much higher-ranked commanders led delegations 
abroad.
257
  This reflected the PLA’s view of these particular visits as largely functional 
and not strategic, and also met the PLA’s goal of having officers outside the General 
Department learn about foreign militaries first hand.
258
  As the defence relationship 
developed, functional exchanges increased as interactions and visits took place at lower 
rank levels.
259
  In June 2007 a visit by a Foreign Affairs Working Group from the Foreign 
Affairs Office of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence was led by a senior naval 
captain.  The programme included discussions on the Sino-New Zealand military 
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exchange programme, PLAN ship visits to New Zealand and briefings on regional 
security and defence policy.
260
  In return the PLA hosted a number of visits from NZDF 
personnel such as Air Commodore Kevin Short in June 2009, who attended a PASOLS 
meeting and discussed logistics.
261
  
 
Education exchanges were a typical form of defence engagement extended out beyond 
traditional allies to potential and former adversaries as part of ‘new’ defence diplomacy.  
New Zealand regularly offered places to PLA personnel at the NZDF Command and Staff 
College, dependent on their level of English proficiency.
262
   The College visited China 
several times, most recently in December 2012, when they were accompanied by the 
Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Jack Steer.  The first visit took place in September 1998, 
when students from the RNZAF Command and Staff College (which later became the 
NZDF Command and Staff College) visited China.
263
  In return, 41 PLA Air Force 
students from their Campaign Command course visited New Zealand in June 1999 during 
their overseas study tour.
264
  NZDF students returned to China in August 2002.
265
  The 
Chinese Ambassador was invited to the NZDF Command and Staff College to speak to 
the students for the first time in September 2012. 
 
The exchanges also go in the other direction.  The PLA’s Foreign Languages University 
in Luoyang hold a position for a NZDF Chinese language student.  Language training is 
an important component of the relationship, and providing Chinese-speaking defence 
attachés was seen as a way of demonstrating New Zealand’s professionalism and 
commitment to the relationship.
266
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Military exercises were another manifestation of the expansion of China’s defence 
diplomacy.  Since the late 1990’s China reversed its policy on exercising with foreign 
militaries and has undertaken at least 37 exercises and training with a range of different 
countries.
267
  Combined exercises served several functions; they offered the PLA an 
opportunity to demonstrate improving capabilities, an opportunity to observe and learn 
from foreign militaries in an operational environment, and they served as trust-building 
exercises.
268
  Typically, China exhibited a preference for non-combat exercises over 
combat-oriented ones.  The PLA Navy (PLAN) considered that such exercises had greater 
practical value by helping them to expand their operations outside home waters and by 
developing communication abilities with other naval forces.  The PLAN and Royal New 
Zealand Navy (RNZN) participated together in the Joint Maritime Search and Rescue 
Exercise held in the Tasman Sea early October 2007.    China recently began conducting 
counter-piracy and counter-terrorism exercises with other nations,
269
 presumably for the 
same reasons.  New Zealand, China and Australia held a tri-lateral humanitarian 
assistance disaster relief exercise, Cooperation Spirit in late October 2012.
270
  Seven 
NZDF staff attended the exercise for the first time (having only sent an observer in 2010), 
held in Brisbane with approximately 30 PLA staff and 24 Australian personnel.  The 
NZDF Senior National Officer described the purpose of the exercise as: 
 
 The New Zealand Defence Force has a good relationship with our international 
partners and it’s important for us to work closely to build interoperability so we 
can perform tasks together when required.  Participating in exercises like 
Cooperation Spirit 2012 enables the Defence Force to prepare for a variety of 
contingencies to ensure that New Zealand can play its part in working with 
other nations to respond effectively to humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
events, and contributing to regional peace and stability.
271
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Port calls 
Port calls or visits by naval ships occupy a special place in Chinese defence diplomacy, 
with PLAN visits abroad often receiving considerable publicity in the Chinese press.
272
  
Chinese publicity about the 40 year anniversary of Sino – New Zealand diplomatic 
relations featured port calls between the two nations heavily.
273
 This was significant as for 
some time the PLAN rarely ventured beyond Chinese territorial waters. Between 1979 
and 1987 China received port calls from 33 foreign warships, yet its own first foreign port 
call was not until 1985.
274
  The visit by two New Zealand frigates to Shanghai in 1987 
was a relatively early move in this respect.   
 
The value China placed on the expansion of defence diplomacy in the 1990s was 
illustrated by the 1997 Pacific voyages of two guide missile destroyers, at the time the 
only relatively capable and modern warships the PLAN had.
275
  The first visit by the 
PLAN to New Zealand took place shortly after this in April 1998, when two ships, the 
Qingdao and Shichang, made a port call to Auckland.
276
   The Royal New Zealand Navy 
made a reciprocal visit the following year.  Following these initial exchanges, port calls 
have been a regular feature of defence diplomacy between the two countries, as follows: 
 
Table 4: Port calls conducted by China and New Zealand 1996 - 2012
277
 
Date  Details 
April 1998 Qingdao and Shichang visited Auckland. 
 
October 1998 HMNZS Wellington and HMNZS Endeavour visited Qingdao, the 
headquarters of the PLAN North Sea fleet. 
 
October 2001 Yichang and Taichang visited Auckland. 
 
27-30 September 2002 HMNZS Te Kaha visited Shanghai.  
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Date  Details 
 
17 – 21 June 2005 HMNZS Te Mana and HMNZS Endeavour to Shanghai. 
 
7 – 10 October 2007 Haerbin and Hongzehu visited Auckland. 
 
11 – 22 October 2007 HMNZS Te Kaha visited Shanghai. 
 
April 2009 HMNZS Te Mana and Endeavour visited Qingdao for PLAN 60
th
 
Anniversary 
 
16-19 May 2010 HMNZS Te Kaha visited Shanghai. 
 
11 – 15 September 2010 
 
Training ship Zhenghe and frigate Mianyang visit New Zealand. 
27 June 2011 HMNZS Te Mana scheduled to visit Shanghai (cancelled) 
 
5-14 May 2013 HMNZ Te Mana visited Shanghai 
 
Visits to distant ports provided navies with practice in the seamanship and logistics 
required to undertake long-distance deployments.  China analysts who viewed defence 
diplomacy activities primarily as a means of making the PLA a more formidable fighting 
force regarded these port calls as a means of developing  PLAN ‘blue-water’ or open 
ocean capabilities.
278
    Other analysts however pointed out that China’s tentative steps 
were very different from carrying out major sustained naval deployments like those the 
United States Navy is capable of.
279
  The fact that the New Zealand could reciprocate 
with port calls to China highlighted the high-level of capability and seamanship enjoyed 
by the RNZN and demonstrated that the PLAN has many valuable skills to learn from the 
RNZN.     The schedule of visits by Navy ships to China underlines their significance. As 
HMNZS Te Mana’s commanding officer pointed out during a port call to Shanghai in 
2007, “considering New Zealand has only two frigates that really do the bulk of this type 
of engagement, to say that in two years we’ll be back, that’s big. There’s no doubt New 
Zealand is wishing to grow its relationship with China.”280 
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During a 2007 visit, RNZN bands played ashore and an open day was held. Sports and 
cultural events took place while the crew engaged in some sightseeing.
281
  On the 
occasion of the fourth visit by PLAN ships to New Zealand in September 2010, two 
RNZN officer cadets were invited to train aboard with PLAN cadets; the first time naval 
officers from a Western country were invited to do so (although two Royal Australian 
Navy midshipmen were also present).
282
  Then Defence Minister Wayne Mapp remarked: 
  
 That’s an important gesture.  The naval visit continues a pattern of improved 
dialogue between our nations. This fits as part and parcel as China’s reaching 
out to the broader Asia Pacific community.
283
   
 
On leaving, the Chinese staged a position-keeping exercise by practising naval formations 
with HMNZS Wellington.
284
  Such short exercises were common. As a RNZN officer 
noted during an earlier visit, “it’s not a big deal in terms of how complex it is or how 
difficult it is for us to do, but it is a big deal in our growing relationship with them. It’s 
another little advance in the relationship.”285 
 
Multilateral cooperation 
New Zealand and China participated in several common multilateral security cooperation 
activities, including the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (foreign ministers), the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (foreign ministers), the East Asia Summit, the Shangri-La 
Dialogue, and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (a track II non-
governmental forum).
286
   China has also begun to engage in multilateral defence forums 
such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium (WPNS), and the Pacific Armies Senior Officers Logistics Seminar 
(PASOLS).  Inaugurated in 1999, the Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) was first 
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patronised by China in 2011
287
 and New Zealand is hosting a combined PACC/PAMs 
later in 2013.  All of these forums evolved from older patterns of defence diplomacy; 
originally initiated to progress interoperability between key states within the region.  Over 
time, new partners such as China were invited to participate.  For example, PASOLS was 
first convened in 1971 with the purpose of developing formal arrangements for the 
provision of reciprocal logistics support between nations during coalition operations, 
humanitarian assistance disaster relief and United Nations operations.  The first 
participants were Taiwan, Indonesia, the Khmer Republic, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, United States and South Viet Nam.  New Zealand joined in 1984, and China in 
1995.  Lower-ranked senior officers attend these types of meetings, such as the NZDF 
Brigadier who attended the September 2009 PASOLS meeting in China. 
 
As pointed out in Chapter Three, much of this multilateral cooperation took place around 
topics such as military roles in peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief. Such topics were both non-threatening for former and potential adversaries and 
assuage concerns around the potential for core war-fighting capabilities to be 
compromised.  For example, the theme of the 2011 PACC, which China attended for the 
first time, was Building Land Forces ’ Capacity through Multilateral Security 
Cooperation.
288
  
 
Issues in Sino – New Zealand Defence Diplomacy 
The NZDF is quite happy to engage with the PLA, particularly as our size difference 
eliminates us as a potential threat, and offers China an opportunity to ‘practice’ 
engagement with a Western nation, effectively mitigating risk to their potential 
relationships with larger Western powers, most notably the United States.  Similar 
sentiment is seen in other aspects of the wider Sino-New Zealand relationship, such as 
China’s first Free Trade Agreement concluded in 2008.  This also reflects a broader 
recognition of New Zealand’s importance as an example of a Western nation responding 
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to China’s rise.289  Neither China nor New Zealand has to worry about misperceptions 
and miscalculations about the other’s intentions and capabilities. 
 
Conditionality 
One of the dilemmas Cottey and Forster recognised was how far should defence 
diplomacy be tied a partner’s cooperation or progress on other issues and its domestic 
policies?  Known as conditionality, this dilemma has presented issues for a number of 
countries and is a persistent feature of debates on the use of defence diplomacy.   Civilian 
control of the military does not appear to be an issue that impacts on NZDF – PLA 
relations.  Over time, the combined effect of professionalism and international contact has 
somewhat de-emphasised the ideological outlook of the PLA.
290
  New Zealand and China 
have some fundamental differences in terms of their values, beliefs and political systems, 
which both parties openly acknowledge.
291
  When defence links were first being explored 
in the mid 1990s, Gerald Hensley explained that: 
  
 ...we were past that stage. The Deng Xiaoping era had changed all that. Plus 
the obvious fact that in 10, 20, 30 years China would be a dominant influence 
in the region along with the United States and Japan. So there was no concern 
about Communism, which was distinctly fading in China itself as a motivating 
force.  It was just common sense; that the region was changing and we needed 
to adapt.
292
 
 
When questioned about how New Zealand deals approaches dealing with China, the 
former Secretary of Defence, John McKinnon, pointed out: 
 
 You know this is a single-party... Communist state.  You know the military 
exists within a different framework from the way the military operates here [in 
New Zealand]. That’s part of the reason why you want to talk to them, because 
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you know you are going to be operating across different premises and 
constructs.
293
 
 
Other officials were more emphatic:  
 
 ...we don’t have any concerns about that because we have been operating in 
that framework since 1972. When you build a relationship with China you do it 
very much within that context. That’s the nature of the party at the other end of 
the relationship. [...] Diplomacy is conducted between states and that is the 
nature of that state. We don’t refuse to engage with China out of any approval 
or disapproval of the nature of their government. [...] That’s just the basis on 
how we deal with China. It’s not a point upon which we engage in 
discussion.
294
 
 
Human rights are a perennial issue, but a number of New Zealand foreign officials 
explained that while they are a factor, such issues are pursued and New Zealand’s views 
stated through different channels to the defence relationship. Tony Browne added 
“nothing is completely separate. Many different parts of the relationship are the subject of 
a sector-specific dialogue. [...] You’re talking to different people, on different issues.”295 
 
Prospects for Sino NZ defence relations   
The NZDF still has a modest relationship with China, one that has been described as 
“appropriate to the circumstances.”296  Commentators have said that there is scope for 
New Zealand to build on initial contacts to achieve a greater understanding of China’s 
military objectives and what challenge they may pose to countries in the Western 
Pacific.
297
  It is clear from discussions with senior officials that New Zealand will 
continue to invest in defence and other activities in order to contribute to an enduring 
political relationship with China.
298
  For China, worthwhile bilateral relationships must 
have substance beyond the purely commercial.
299
  It has been said elsewhere that the 
defence relationship should not be judged on any single visit, but rather on the sum of all 
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visits.
300
  Indeed, John McKinnon described New Zealand’s defence diplomacy with 
China as “a cumulative game.”301 
 
It is difficult however to see how the relationship might be maintained and strengthened.  
There certainly are prospects in terms of the types of interaction between the two 
countries.  Issues such as counter-terrorism, cyber warfare, Antarctic resource protection, 
maritime surveillance and disaster relief in South Pacific stand out as possible avenues 
where New Zealand could broaden cooperation, particularly in terms of Chinese armed 
forces structure and their evolving missions.  Former Defence Minister Dr Wayne Mapp 
considered that the relationship needed more thought put into it and foresaw the conduct 
of combat-oriented exercises.
302
  However, further steps in traditional relationships 
typically include things like technology transfer and intelligence sharing, which New 
Zealand is unlikely to be able to follow through with China on due to our place within the 
‘five-eyes’ community.303 Resources are likely to be the biggest limiting factor. As 
former Secretary of Defence John McKinnon pointed out: 
 
 Our difficulty is just a sheer numbers. We will probably continue to send ships 
to visit Chinese ports but we won’t be sending them at a higher rate because we 
just don’t have that capability. We have a range of dialogues; I don’t think 
we’ll want to have too many more, we don’t have the numbers of staff to do it.  
The limit is not about what we could do but what we have the resources to do. 
Clearly that doesn’t apply on the Chinese side in the same way. They are 
mindful of where our limits are.
304
 
 
Conclusion 
The Sino-New Zealand defence relationship developed well before the concept of defence 
diplomacy was formally advanced. Initial moves in the relationship occurred in 1995, 
well before the United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review was released in 1998.   
 
Despite this, New Zealand defence officials had a clear sense of the connection between 
defence and broader foreign policy goals at the time, as evidenced by Gerald Hensley’s 
use of the term “security diplomacy.”  The China example proves that New Zealand was 
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conducting defence diplomacy well before it was identified and further defined by Cottey 
and Forster.  
 
Both sides regularly point out that the Sino-New Zealand relationship has had many 
‘firsts’. It is important to note that the status of China’s relationship with New Zealand is 
based upon the Chinese level of comfort with New Zealand.  From the Chinese 
perspective, if they can get it right with New Zealand, they can go on and achieve the 
same goals with other Western nations.  
 
New Zealand’s defence relationship must be considered in light of the broader political 
and economic relationship with China. The defence relationship mirrors the wider 
political relationship. This relationship is characterised by regular high-level contacts, 
including a widening range of dialogues, and thus defence relations have also seen an 
increase in high-level contacts and the establishment of bilateral strategic dialogues. 
Almost all of China’s top Politburo members have visited New Zealand. In that context, it 
is not unusual then to have seen an increase in senior Defence exchanges to the point that 
they are occurring on an almost monthly basis.   
 
The NZDF believes China’s interest in defence relations is based on what China can learn 
from the NZDF in terms of military reform and capabilities such as logistics and 
administration.  The NZDF, while small, is a modern and professional Western military 
force in the same model as the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, and the 
PLA can learn much about civilianisation of defence activities, training, force 
modernisation, and the employment of non-commissioned officers for example.  From a 
foreign policy perspective, the defence relationship is one part of New Zealand Inc’s 
long-term engagement of China.  Defence ties generate goodwill and are one component 
among many that comprise a comprehensive bilateral relationship.   
 
Sino – New Zealand defence relations do not fit neatly into the model of ‘new’ defence 
diplomacy put forward by Cottey and Forster.  Instead of the NZDF as a ‘Western’ 
military reaching out to its former foe the PLA, the development of military relations 
between the two countries has taken place within the context of the PLA’s own expansion 
of defence relationships throughout the region and the wider world.   
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CHAPTER FIVE New Zealand’s Defence Relations with Viet 
Nam 
 
Introduction and the development of Viet Nam – New Zealand Relations 
New Zealand’s defence relationship with the Viet Nam People’s Army (VPA) is a key 
example of New Zealand’s burgeoning defence diplomacy with a former enemy.  In the 
new strategic environment following the Cold War featuring the rise of China and the 
development of transnational security threats, Viet Nam has gone from the embodiment 
of the ‘Domino Theory’ of communist aggression to a nation with demonstrated common 
security interests with New Zealand.  Viet Nam has entered dialogue with New Zealand 
in a wide variety of multinational forums such as various ASEAN bodies, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and most recently, the Trans Pacific Partnership.
305
  
Defence engagement with Viet Nam is particularly poignant considering New Zealand's 
contribution to the Viet Nam War.   
 
Indochina played a significant role in New Zealand’s national security calculus following 
the end of the Second World War and the adjustment to new strategic realities.  The 
1950-1953 Korean War reinforced New Zealand’s bipartisan commitment to the Western 
camp in the Cold War and brought a heightened sensitivity to the communist threat to 
regional stability.   New Zealand’s military involvement in Viet Nam was seen as a way 
of maintaining the United States security guarantee.
306
  New Zealand troops fought the 
VPA in South Viet Nam between 1965 and 1972, losing 37 service members.
307
 
 
The same Labour Government that initiated diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China in 1972 also withdrew the last New Zealand troops from Viet Nam that 
same year.  Following the withdrawal, New Zealand maintained only peripheral interest 
in the continued conflict between North and South Viet Nam.  Viet Nam continued to 
play a role in defining New Zealand’s perspective on international security through the 
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1980s.  Viet Nam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the Soviet expansion of the Cam 
Ranh Bay naval base were both identified in New Zealand’s 1983 Defence Review as 
indicators of a deteriorating international security situation.
308
     
 
Within Viet Nam itself, the situation was changing. Viet Nam’s economic performance 
struggled after 1975 and as a result, the Communist Party of Viet Nam launched a 
massive programme of economic change, beginning with the adoption of the reform 
policy named doi moi, or renovation. In May 1988, the Vietnamese government resolved 
to reorient its foreign trade away from the communist bloc towards the Asia Pacific and 
capitalist world and undertook what it termed a “multi-directional foreign policy 
orientation.”309  Viet Nam’s improved economic position continued to play an indirect 
role in military reforms, and was a significant driver of the VPA’s force modernisation, 
characterised by reductions in its large standing ground force together with enhancement 
of the navy and air force. 
 
In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Viet Nam without a formal ally. The 
challenge then became how to develop relations with former foes and new multilateral 
institutions to bolster national security.   A priority was to mend its strained relations with 
China, damaged by Viet Nam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, the signing of its Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and their border conflict in 1979.
310
  
Viet Nam fully normalised diplomatic relations with China in 1991. 
 
Since then, Viet Nam has become increasingly strategically significant. Its situation as a 
littoral state in the South China Sea puts it in an area of contested resource claims and 
potential conflict.  It is an emerging middle income country with significant trade 
potential for New Zealand.  It has been undergoing gradual defence modernisation and is 
transforming from a ground-force oriented defensive power to one with increasing 
maritime projection capabilities.  Since joining the ASEAN Regional Forum as an 
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observer in 1994, Viet Nam has become a key player both in this forum and other 
regional security institutions, and it is recognised as an emerging strategic partner of the 
United States.
311
  China’s rise and its challenge to United States primacy present the most 
pressing security challenge for Viet Nam. It has therefore sought to develop defence ties 
with all the major powers including the United States, Russia, Britain, France as well as 
China.
312
  It has also developed relations with a range of smaller states in the region – 
including New Zealand.   
 
The Development of New Zealand’s Defence Diplomacy with Viet Nam 
Prior to 1994, Viet Nam was internationally isolated,
313
 but since this time there has been 
a steady rise in the number of foreign high-level defence delegations visiting the 
country.
314
  This expansion of defence diplomacy took place within a changed strategic 
context that included the easing of regional tensions, particularly along the Sino-
Vietnamese border; the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; a new 
emphasis on economic development and regional co-operation; and the loss of economic 
and military aid from Moscow.  
 
Viet Nam recognised the broader utility of its armed forces in foreign policy at an early 
stage.  Its first Defence White Paper, released in 1998, made international cooperation 
one of seven ‘key measures’ for the VPA.315  Commenting on the White Paper, the 
Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National Defence advocated the expansion of defence 
relations with other countries, specifically China, Japan and the United States, which 
would also enhance Vietnam's broader political, economic and diplomatic relations with 
these countries.
316
   New Zealand opened an embassy in Ha Noi in 1995 but it was not 
until 2001 that the New Zealand Defence Attaché based in Bangkok was accredited to 
Viet Nam, marking the formalisation of defence links.  The defence relationship had 
modest beginnings, with small scale support and training for the purposes of capacity 
building, conducted under the auspices of NZDF’s Mutual Assistance Programme.  In the 
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early 2000s the VPA began making tentative steps in further developing its defence 
diplomacy activities, mainly with high-level military exchanges with neighbours.
317
  The 
first high-level exchange between the VPA and the NZDF occurred in 2004 when the 
New Zealand Chief of Army, Major General Jerry Mateparae visited Viet Nam.  A senior 
MFAT official put the VPA’s motivations into perspective, stating “the Vietnamese 
would have pushed the high-level contacts very strongly, because they do it in other 
aspects of the relationship.”318  
 
Viet Nam’s recent defence diplomacy efforts should be seen in the context of Viet Nam’s 
wider engagement with the world, including joining the World Trade Organisation in 
2007,
319
 gaining a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council in 2008, 
and moves towards contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations.   
 
Much of the focus of policy analysis on Viet Nam’s defence diplomacy activities 
revolved around relations between the Viet Nam People’s Army and the United States 
military. Military relations between the United States and Viet Nam were normalised in 
1996, but they continued to be hampered by the hangover of the Vietnam War.  Legacy 
issues included prisoners of war and the remains of missing personnel on the United 
States military side, while the Vietnamese military brought up the effects of Agent 
Orange and alleged United States Government support to anti-regime organisations, along 
with more general suspicions about United States motives.
320
  Typically, the areas of 
defence cooperation between the two countries have been limited to areas of little 
controversy; peacekeeping, environmental security, search and rescue and disaster 
response.
321
  This focus on the United States has largely obscured the significant progress 
made by Viet Nam in its relations with other Western nations such as New Zealand.   
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In May 2005, Vietnamese President Phan Van Khai concluded his first visit to Wellington 
with the signing of a Declaration of Cooperation that established a framework for 
developing bilateral relationships in a number of areas including defence.  The 
Declaration explained the aims of security cooperation were to “enhance mutual trust and 
understanding, build bilateral cooperation [and] strengthen cooperation in countering 
terrorism.”322  
 
In 2009, the Vietnamese General Secretary Nong Duc Manh visited New Zealand and 
issued a joint statement with New Zealand Prime Minister John Key in which they agreed 
to establish a bilateral Comprehensive Partnership to update and extend the 2005 
Declaration.
323
  The Comprehensive Partnership paved the way for regular bilateral 
defence dialogues between the two countries on issues including counter-terrorism, 
maritime security and peacekeeping operations. 
 
The relationship progressed further in 2010, when New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray 
McCully visited Viet Nam in July.  The Foreign Ministers of the two countries signed the 
New Zealand Viet Nam Action Plan 2010-2013 to give effect to the Comprehensive 
Partnership. The Action Plan sets out a range of initiatives including defence cooperation.  
Specifically, the two parties agreed: 
 
 To exchange high-level military visits; 
 To hold annual Defence Policy Talks; 
 To continue to provide assistance to the Vietnamese military through the 
New Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme with a particular focus on 
English language training, military training design and techniques, 
engineer training and command and leadership skills for Vietnamese 
officers. 
 To exchange information and experience on United Nations 
peacekeeping operations; and  
 To consider the offer by Viet Nam for New Zealand military personnel to 
study Vietnamese in the Academy of Military Technology.
324
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A new Action Plan was due to be agreed between the end of 2013 and the start of 2014.  
It was expected that the second Action Plan would be more focussed on specific areas, 
but in terms of defence it was likely to be a continuation of current activity.
325
  
 
Purposes of Viet Nam – New Zealand Defence Diplomacy 
Viet Nam’s second Defence White Paper, released in 2004, explained that the 
establishment and promotion of relations of exchange and cooperation with the armed 
forces of other countries was “in the interests of consolidating peace and in the consistent 
implementation of the foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, door-opening, multi-
lateralisation and diversification of external relations…”326  Purposes such as conflict 
prevention were a lower priority.  
 
For Viet Nam, the defence relationship with New Zealand became an expression of its 
growing regional profile and reflected its growing influence in the region.  As a senior 
foreign affairs official explained: 
 
 The Vietnamese […] attach a lot of importance to being able to point to these 
sorts of relationships and being able to demonstrate that it is being taken 
seriously internationally.  Over the years that has certainly been a big driver.  It 
was about their own mana.
327
 
 
Less strategically, the Viet Nam Ministry of National Defence saw defence relationships 
as opportunities for the development of the VPA.  Two broad rationales behind Viet 
Nam’s defence engagement can be discerned from reading Viet Nam’s Defence White 
Papers.  The first is the development of the VPA through cooperation and research into 
the military art, science and technology, with the VPA particularly keen to modernise its 
command and control systems.  The second is to bolster its domestic arms industry.  Viet 
Nam’s defence diplomacy is geared towards force modernisation in terms of both 
structures and equipment.  This has driven Viet Nam to reach out to both its traditional 
suppliers such as Russia, but also to extend defence cooperation with the UK, France, and 
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India.  The priorities for these external defence relationships are training, education and 
academic exchanges.
328
   
 
The VPA considered that its military diplomacy provided other countries with an 
understanding of Viet Nam’s national defence policies, which contributed to the overall 
peace and security of the region and the wider world.
329
  Viet Nam’s military diplomacy 
activities included academic exchanges, military exchanges, participation in regional 
seminars, conferences and workshops, ship visits and participation in multinational 
activities and exercises including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, anti-piracy, 
anti drug trafficking patrols and maritime search and rescue.  New Zealand’s defence 
diplomacy activities with Viet Nam can be grouped into four broad categories; high-level 
exchanges, professional military education exchanges, port calls and multilateral 
cooperation. 
 
Strategic Exchanges 
The relationship has evolved into new areas including annual bilateral talks.
330
  Before 
looking at high-level exchanges, it should be acknowledged that the VPA describes 
exchanges at the deputy-ministerial level as Logistics, reflecting Vietnamese 
organisational practice by which the head of the VPA General Logistics Department is 
also the deputy minister of National Defence.  Thus, foreign delegations received by the 
deputy minister are also placed in the Logistics category.
331
  High-level military 
exchanges between Viet Nam and New Zealand between 2001 and 2013 are listed in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: High Level Defence Exchanges between New Zealand and Viet Nam
332
 
Date Delegation 
2004 Major General Jerry Mateparae Chief of Army to Viet Nam 
 
November 2006 Phil Goff, Defence Minister to Viet Nam 
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Date Delegation 
 
Early 2007 Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Huy Hieu, Vice Defence 
Minister to New Zealand 
 
22-27 September 2007 Paul Sinclair, Head of IDR Branch to Viet Nam (for defence 
policy talks) 
 
August 2008  Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae Chief of Defence to Viet 
Nam 
 
25-29 July 2009 Brigadier Phil Gibbons to Viet Nam (for bilateral defence talks) 
 
1-11 March 2010  Major General Rhys Jones, Chief of Army to Viet Nam 
 
Mid - March 2010 Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vice Minister of Defence 
to New Zealand 
 
Mid - 2010 Air Commodore Kevin Short to Viet Nam (for bilateral defence 
talks) 
 
10-16 October 2010 Wayne Mapp, Defence Minister to Viet Nam (for the first 
ADMM+) 
 
July 2011 Unknown (Viet Nam officials to New Zealand for first bilateral 
talks) 
 
20 -23 September 2012 Chief of Navy to Viet Nam* 
 
25-26 September 2012 Defence Talks in Ha Noi 
 
11- 14 November 2012 Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Minister of Defence to New Zealand. 
 
22-25 March 2013 Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defence to New 
Zealand. 
  
*this visit occurred during the naval port call described in more detail in the section below. 
 
Annual bilateral defence talks have taken place since the first in July 2011 held in 
Wellington New Zealand.
333
  The second was held in Ha Noi in September 2012, while 
the third occurred in March 2013.  These talks have not yet progressed to a ‘strategic 
partnership,’ which is a term Viet Nam applies to particularly close bilateral relations.334  
The content of these exchanges is not reported in detail, but they covered “defence-related 
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issues in Asia Pacific as well as opportunities for future cooperation in the region”335 
including “the scope for strengthened bilateral defence links in future […] and heightened 
contact and cooperation in regional forums.”336  
 
Educational exchanges 
Viet Nam was included in the MAP programme in June 2007, following the approval of 
the Minister of Defence.  Much of the training and assistance provided to Viet Nam 
through MAP since then revolves around English language training, including the 
dispatch of NZDF teams to Viet Nam to provide English for Speakers of Other 
Languages training.  Learning English enables them to participate in further training 
offered by New Zealand and other English-speaking nations, as well as to take part in 
military exercises where the participants use English as a common language.  The 
Defence Learning Centre in Linton hosted nine Vietnamese officers for a ten week 
English language course in 2011.  The NZDF has also sponsored Vietnamese personnel 
through Australian Defence Force language training.
337
  This military training 
complements the New Zealand Aid Programme’s English Language Teaching for 
Officials Programme, which has seen several hundred mid-level and senior Vietnamese 
officials spend extended time in New Zealand since the early 1990s.
338
  Vietnamese 
military personnel have participated in a variety of education opportunities focusing on 
maritime skills, aeronautical engineering and senior officer development.
339
  Courses 
attended by Vietnamese personnel have ranged from English language training, initial and 
junior officer training, instructor training through to NZDF Command and Staff College.  
The official purpose of this training was to build capacity in the Vietnamese military 
through leadership development and professional training. 
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Vietnamese officers generally attend the NZDF Command and Staff College every 
second year.  A delegation from the VPA training and education headquarters visited the 
NZDF Staff College at the end of 2012 during annual MAP talks.  Students and staff from 
the NZDF's Command and Staff College made a visit to Viet Nam in 2005.  Since 2007, 
Viet Nam’s National Defence Academy has accepted foreign officers in its training 
courses
340
 and between 3 March and 4 June 2008 students and staff from the NZDF Joint 
Staff Course visited the Staff Course at the National Defence Academy during the course 
of their overseas study tour.
341
    
 
Port calls 
Ship visits between Viet Nam and New Zealand since the establishment of a formal 
defence relationship in 2001 are listed in Table 6.  As has been the case with much of 
New Zealand’s defence relations with Viet Nam, port calls to Viet Nam have been one-
sided.   Viet Nam is reorienting from a land-focused force to a maritime one, but its major 
maritime interests are in the immediate littoral areas of the South China Sea.  As a result, 
despite a great deal of maritime capability development, this has been focused on the 
development of corvettes, submarines and missile-armed attack boats suitable for 
operations in this area and Viet Nam has very little ability to send ships beyond the 
immediate region, let alone across the Pacific to New Zealand.  Viet Nam’s response has 
been to instead invite naval visits from other countries to them; invitations that New 
Zealand has been eager to accept.  For some time naval diplomacy was limited by Viet 
Nam’s policy of allowing one visit from one country, to one port once a year but this 
policy appears to be changing.  
 
 
Table 6: Port calls conducted by Viet Nam and New Zealand 2001 - 2013
342
 
Date Details 
2002 HMNZS Te Kaha and Endeavour visited Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
2004 HMNZS Te Kaha and Endeavour visited Ho Chi Minh City. 
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Date Details 
August 2006 HMNZS Te Kaha and Endeavour visited Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
June 2011 HMNZS Te Mana visited Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
24-29 April 2013 HMNZS Te Mana visited Ho Chi Minh City 
 
Some insight into the purposes of naval ship visits can be discerned from the June 2011 
visit by HMNZS Te Mana.  During its five-day visit, the crew paid courtesy visits to local 
government and local military commanders in the city. They played volleyball with a 
team from the Navy Technical School and undertook some sightseeing.
343
  While these 
visits served to promote friendly ties between the two nation’s armed forces, they 
otherwise seemed to provide little in the way of substantive policy discussion or 
functional purpose.  Indeed, while the RNZN planned to conduct the port visit at the 
Vietnamese naval base at Da Nang, its distance from New Zealand government 
representation and New Zealand business interests centred in Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh 
City respectively meant that the ship was redirected to Ho Chi Minh City.  The fact that 
Da Nang was regarded as lower down in priority demonstrated that diplomatic and trade 
interests took precedence over military engagement.  As a senior MFAT official 
explained: 
 
 ...if they had all the time in the world, we might have recommended it but if 
you are going to send a ship you have to touch other buttons and decide what 
the biggest bang for your buck is and it wasn’t going down to Da Nang.344 
 
Ship visits support wider government and commercial interests by raising New Zealand’s 
profile in the country.  There is usually a function for invited VIPs, as well as public open 
days, while the crew might engage in sporting contacts and undertake community work. 
During the most recent visit to Ho Chi Minh City, the ship’s complement visited a girls 
home that was funded by the New Zealand Consular-General, and visited an international 
school described as New Zealand’s largest education investment in Viet Nam.345 
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Multilateral cooperation 
Viet Nam has demonstrated a keen ability take part in multilateral institutions.  As 
ASEAN Chair in 2010, Viet Nam helped establish the ADMM+ and also used this role to 
internationalise its own bilateral security issues such as the South China Sea issue.   
Given ASEAN’s traditional reluctance to become a security body, the establishment of 
ADMM+ represented a significant milestone and was the first official defence forum 
involving Defence Ministers of ASEAN Member States and key extra-regional 
countries.
346
  Viet Nam’s support for the ADMM+ was a response to its frustration over 
the ‘talk shop’ nature of the ASEAN Regional Forum.347  A senior MFAT official pointed 
out that Viet Nam “brokered [ADMM+] through in remarkable time, and really lead the 
process.”348   
 
Viet Nam and New Zealand also work together in regional forums on a functional level. 
One example is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which originated in the 
1990s, when countries in the region acted beyond the framework of the Cold War to 
promote naval cooperation.  Viet Nam first joined WPNS in 1994. Since being approved 
as a member, Viet Nam has only selectively participated, most likely as a result of 
economic woes.  Viet Nam has not participated in any WPNS activities that have been 
hosted in New Zealand.  
 
Issues arising from New Zealand defence diplomacy with Viet Nam 
In terms of the challenges associated with the conduct of defence diplomacy discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three, the defence relationship between the NZDF and the VPA has 
proven to be unproblematic. Despite New Zealand’s historical involvement in the 
Vietnam War there is not the same level of sensitivity and debate over the relationship, as 
has been the case in the United States.  There have however, been limits to defence ties 
and the next section looks at two issues in more detail; the application of conditions on 
the relationship and reciprocity.   
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Conditionality  
Unlike Australia and the United States, New Zealand has been able to pursue defence ties 
with Viet Nam without controversy.  New Zealand was one of the first countries in the 
Western world to recognise the regime in the newly unified Republic of Viet Nam in 
1975.  The development of New Zealand’s foreign relations with Viet Nam was 
unhindered by the impact of a large Vietnamese émigré population with antipathy to the 
Ha Noi government, as was the case in Australia and the United States.  Viet Nam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 resolved the biggest impediment to improving 
relations with the international community.  It is also acknowledged that New Zealand 
was less likely to touch on awkward issues like freedom of religion and human rights.
349
  
As a result of these factors, New Zealand’s defence ties with Viet Nam have been 
unimpeded by domestic disapproval.   
 
New Zealand has not imposed conditions on defence relations with Viet Nam.  Despite 
doi moi and attendant political reforms, human rights abuses are still rife,
350
 and the VPA 
does have an internal security role.
351
  Yet such issues have not been brought up by New 
Zealand defence representatives in discussions with their Vietnamese partners.  New 
Zealand’s approach has been to address human rights concerns through separate channels. 
This was explained by an MFAT official as “we deal with human rights in a separate 
way. It wouldn’t be discussed in a defence discussion.”352 
 
Nor does Viet Nam’s system of government, being an authoritarian one-party state, or the 
highly politicised role of the VPA in domestic politics appear to present any impediments 
to New Zealand defence engagement.  As the same MFAT official noted, “we accept Viet 
Nam is a communist system and we are not, and we have differences. We accept that we 
do things differently and there’s never any need to discuss it.”353  While discussing 
aspects of the early diplomatic relationship, the official did admit that “there was a bit of 
a distance created by concerns over different political systems [...] so it didn’t progress 
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rapidly.”354   This notwithstanding, New Zealand increasingly shares a number of 
common security interests with Viet Nam.  Both countries have a strong commitment to 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
355
  Viet Nam attended a Proliferation Security 
Initiative meeting in New Zealand in 2007.
356
  
 
Reciprocity 
Viet Nam set self-imposed limits on its defence relationships. The 2004 White Paper 
stated that it “[…] consistently advocates neither joining any military alliance not giving 
any foreign countries permission to have military bases in Viet Nam.”357  For some time 
Viet Nam imposed limits on its own ability to exercise with foreign militaries and 
restricted foreign visits to one visit from each country per year, although defence 
policymakers did not acknowledge these as a restraint on New Zealand’s defence 
relationship.
358
  The list of strategic-level visits in Table 5 illustrates a marked imbalance 
in the number of reciprocal exchanges between New Zealand and Viet Nam.  This was 
part of a broader trend: from all countries, Viet Nam received 40 delegations by Service 
Chiefs and above between 1990 and 2004.  In the same period, Viet Nam only sent nine 
equivalent delegations abroad
359
 and none came to New Zealand.  A large factor, and one 
recognised by the NZDF, is the lack of resources the VPA is able to contribute to its 
relationship.  Viet Nam’s Ministry of National Defence admitted that participation in 
defence diplomacy was constrained by the limitations of Viet Nam’s own internal 
resources.
360
  Despite enjoying military spending at 2.5 percent of Viet Nam’s gross 
domestic product,
361
 the VPA has a range of more pressing priorities, such as building its 
maritime presence in the South China Sea to counter competing resource claims from its 
neighbours.   
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Conclusion 
Vietnam’s defence relationship with New Zealand was likely initiated by Ha Noi.  Like 
the People’s Liberation Army of China, it was economic reform and political openness 
which paved the way for the Viet Nam People’s Army to develop external defence 
relations with a range of countries, including New Zealand, that were outside its 
traditional communist orbit.   The strategic situation that Viet Nam found itself in, once 
its only ally the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, compelled Viet Nam to embark on its 
own process of ‘new’ defence diplomacy.  It had to develop relations with former foes 
and take part in new multilateral institutions to meet basic national security needs.   
Having renewed the relationship with former Cold War sponsor Russia and rejuvenated 
old ties with former foes France and the United States, Viet Nam invited the influence of 
major powers back into its immediate region.  Once this was achieved, Viet Nam sought 
assistance with modernising its military and improving its defence-industrial base. This 
enabled Viet Nam to address territorial disputes and resource claims with increased 
confidence and international support. 
 
It was at this point that Viet Nam began to engage with New Zealand.  The VPA’s desire 
to modernise meant that initial ties began with training and support assistance at a low 
level.  This was eventually formalised through Viet Nam’s admission to the NZDF’s 
MAP programme in 2007.  In the meantime, Viet Nam’s regional profile has grown and 
Viet Nam is now an influential leader in the security space, as their role in the 
establishment of ADMM+ demonstrates. Viet Nam’s enthusiasm to progress the New 
Zealand defence ties at the strategic level led to the initiation of regular high-level 
contacts in which regional security concerns could be shared and annual bilateral talks 
now take place between the two Defence establishments.  New Zealand officials 
explained that New Zealand has an interest in developing a close relationship with Viet 
Nam in order to share thinking about a range of regional security issues such as North 
Korea and the South China Sea disputes.  Defence dialogue with Viet Nam provides New 
Zealand a further opportunity to act as a responsible regional partner and obtain access to 
Viet Nam’s views on the regional security environment.  New Zealand is looking for new 
ways to engage militarily with Viet Nam and following the VPA’s announcement that 
they are moving into the peacekeeping space, New Zealand has expressed its willingness 
to assist sharing experience and training to encourage them in this initiative.  
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Ship visits remain an important and highly visible part of the defence relationship.  The 
example provided by the frigate visit to Ho Chi Minh City in 2011 exposed the way in 
which defence ties are used by New Zealand primarily to further diplomatic and trade 
interests.  It suggests that the military value of engagement is lower priority but this might 
be a peculiarity of ship visits.  Other military training and assistance is more targeted to 
Viet Nam’s needs, revolving mainly around English language skills to enable VPA 
personnel to access further training from New Zealand and other nations. 
 
One theme that permeates the development of defence relations between New Zealand 
and Viet Nam is the lack of resources, particularly on the Vietnamese side, to participate.  
Viet Nam’s own priorities are necessarily focused on its immediate neighbours, China 
and ASEAN members, and there has not been much scope for the maturing of the defence 
relationship with New Zealand. In these circumstances, New Zealand has recognised their 
limitations and sought engagement where it can, most notably in multilateral forums 
where Viet Nam is able to engage with New Zealand together with Viet Nam’s more 
important defence partners - China, the United States, Japan and other Asian powers.  
That said, New Zealand officials describe defence links as more or less equal.  
 
Viet Nam’s own slow progress in developing defence ties with New Zealand and other 
nations demonstrates the way in which it takes time to develop the nuances and 
understanding required to build their confidence in the role and recognise the possibilities 
that defence diplomacy offers.  New Zealand has been a willing partner in this process.  
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CHAPTER SIX New Zealand’s defence relations with Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
Indonesia is the largest country in South East Asia. It is enjoying increasing stability and 
prosperity and its influence is growing as it asserts itself more as a regional and 
international leader.
362
 As such it is becoming an attractive regional partner for New 
Zealand politically and economically. But the New Zealand government has faced a 
difficult dilemma in balancing military cooperation with Jakarta with its support for 
democracy, good governance and the upholding of human rights. Over time the military 
relationship has been shaped by changing strategic priorities and domestic opinion. 
 
New Zealand’s changeable defence relationship with Indonesia illustrates one of the key 
tensions between ‘old’ defence cooperation and ‘new’ defence diplomacy.   NZDF links 
with Indonesia’s armed forces, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) demonstrate the 
double standard that Cottey and Forster identified as implicit in defence diplomacy by 
Western countries; that is support for greater civilian control over the military in some 
cases, and close military cooperation with authoritarian regimes in others.
363
   This 
chapter discusses defence relations with Indonesia in two separate phases: before 1999 
and after 2000.  
 
Indonesia as a former and potential foe 
Despite a largely “positive, if shallow”364 history of political relations between the two 
countries, Indonesia has fulfilled the roles of both a former enemy and a potential enemy 
for some time.  While New Zealand was one of the first countries to recognise newly 
independent Indonesia, security concerns arose during the late 1950s when President 
Sukarno set out to establish regional dominance.
365
  Following the success of a similar 
strategy in Dutch West Papua, Indonesia initiated a campaign to destabilise the new 
Federation of Malaysia.   
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Initially, New Zealand did not want to get involved in the dispute, favouring its good 
relationship with Indonesia and being wary of being drawn into another drawn-out 
insurgency like the Malayan Emergency.
366
 However, once Indonesian troops began 
crossing into Borneo, New Zealand armed forces joined those of Britain and Australia in 
countering their infiltration.  While the RNZAF stood ready to bomb Jakarta,
367
 New 
Zealand and Indonesian troops engaged in skirmishes.
368
  The original purpose of the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements established in 1971 and discussed in Chapter Three was to 
provide a measure of assurance to Singapore and Malaysia in the event of further 
Indonesian aggression.   
 
A decade later, Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975 provided another example 
of Indonesian territorial expansionism, and the consolidation of Indonesian rule was to 
prove brutal and bloody for the Timorese. By this time, President Suharto had proven 
anti-communist credentials and his Timor operation was unopposed by regional powers 
exhausted by the conflict in Indochina, New Zealand among them.   By the 1980s 
officials in Australia and New Zealand no longer believed Indonesia was a direct security  
threat,
369
 but a disconnect remained between government views and public opinion.
370
  
During the 1990s, public opinion surveys found one in five Australians considered 
Indonesia a potential threat.
371
  Indonesia was also considered to pose a renewed threat to 
the integrity of Malaysia and potentially Papua New Guinea.
372
   
 
Even though Indonesia became a democratic multi-party state following elections in 1999 
and introduced military reforms, Australian public opinion surveys conducted since this 
time continued to demonstrate Indonesia is the most frequently mentioned potential threat 
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to national security.
373
  The Indonesian President himself acknowledged these opinions 
continued to exist when he said: 
 
 Even in the age of cable television and internet, there are Australians who still 
see Indonesia as an authoritarian country, as a military dictatorship, as a hotbed 
of Islamic extremism or even as an expansionist power.
374
 
 
Frank Wilson analysed the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2010 and pointed out that: 
 
a number of the possible security threats identified in the White Paper could 
relate to Indonesia.  For example the necessity to maintain open sea routes, 
the dangers of illegal incursions by asylum seekers and illegal fishing and 
possible terrorist attacks could in theory involve Indonesia.  And the use of 
force is contemplated in two scenarios that could be linked to Indonesia. 
These are “as part of New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements” and in circumstances when New Zealand would “immediately 
respond to an attack on Australia.”375 
 
Indonesia’s Approach to Defence Diplomacy 
Since its inception, Indonesia has followed a non-aligned foreign policy. It has avoided 
becoming involved in alliances with other countries and has avoided collective security 
arrangements.  As a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia was central in articulating 
ASEAN’s policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, which engendered the long-
standing reluctance among its members to form a formal ASEAN security arrangement.  
Indonesia has always sought an “independent and active” foreign policy.376  A recent 
manifestation of this independent and active foreign policy has been the centrepiece of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy - dynamic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific.   This is achieved 
through the strengthening of regional cooperation and institutions to ensure no single 
power can dominate.
377
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The changing character of Indonesia’s defence relations reflects the central role of the 
military in Indonesian politics, economy and society, which is itself a product of 
Indonesia’s unique geography and development as an independent state.  The TNI has a 
strong nationalist fervour and it carved out a special role for itself as the defender of the 
nation. The TNI was traditionally an “all-inclusive, intrusive, and the dominant force in 
the country’s social and political life.”378   It also meant that the TNI did not believe they 
were subordinate to civil authority.
379
   
 
According to their former doctrine of dwi fungsi (dual function), the TNI acted as a 
guardian of the state through participation in political processes.  This meant that the 
military played a dual function in both the military and civilian spheres.  From 1998, dwi 
fungsi was replaced with a new doctrine, paradigma baru (New Paradigm) that clearly 
shunned political involvement and promoted power sharing with the civilian government.  
It placed more emphasis on the military’s national security role while making clear the 
police’s role in internal security. However, due to a range of factors, the TNI continued to 
wield considerable influence and remains largely autonomous despite its withdrawal from 
a prominent public role.   
 
For much of its history, the TNI’s focus was on its immediate neighbours and territorial 
sovereignty, unresolved territorial disputes, the need to protect its EEZ and the security of 
resources.
380
  More recently, Indonesia’s defence policy emphasised the use of 
diplomacy, through regional and international cooperation, as the first line of defence.
381
  
Indonesian defence diplomacy was oriented towards building a better working 
relationship with partners and rivals in order to prevent conflicts arising or, in the recent 
words of the Indonesian President, “a ‘million friends and zero enemies’ diplomatic 
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strategy.”382  Military ties and exercises assisted Indonesia and fellow ASEAN nations to 
get to know and understand each other, thus removing suspicions and 
misunderstanding.
383
  As the Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa explained, 
the development of bilateral defence relationships with a range of countries including 
China are regarded as “part and parcel of the developments and dynamics of the 
region.”384 
 
Indonesia has acknowledged that the TNI has come a long way in becoming more 
professional and now considers engagement with other countries like the United States, 
and by implication New Zealand, as a necessity to ensure that the process of 
democratisation becomes irreversible.
385
  Indonesian officials also hinted at the role 
combined exercises such as search and rescue cooperation play in raising the comfort 
level between countries involved in territorial disputes in the region.
386
  
 
The Development of Indonesia – New Zealand Defence Diplomacy  
Former Ambassador to Indonesia, Michael Green, described New Zealand’s defence links 
with the country as ‘spasmodic’.387  This ties are discussed in two phases: the first 
covering defence links prior to 1999, and the second looking at the renewal of defence 
cooperation since 2000.   
 
The first phase of defence contacts began in 1953, with the port call by HMNZS Black 
Prince, but it was not until 1961 that the next significant event occurred, when TNI 
General Nasution visited New Zealand.  Nasution was a key figure in the Indonesian 
Army, and played a part in articulating the dwi fungsi philosophy.  The purpose of his 
visit was to state Indonesia’s position on the annexation of Dutch West Guinea (modern 
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West Papua), and to reassure regional governments that it did not have similar ambitions 
for East New Guinea (modern Papua New Guinea), North Borneo or East Timor.
388
 
 
It was not until after the failed 1965 coup and military crackdown, which deposed an 
increasingly unstable Sukarno and ended the Indonesian policy of Konfrontasi with the 
newly established Federation of Malaysia, that more substantial military-to-military 
contacts could be contemplated by New Zealand.  The fact that Indonesia now had a 
military-backed government gave defence links new relevance and it was New Zealand’s 
Minister of Defence who was the first Cabinet Minister to visit Jakarta and meet the new 
leaders.
389
  In 1974 New Zealand formalised defence links with Indonesia with the 
appointment of a Defence Attaché to Jakarta.
390
  The attaché assisted with the 
development of a framework for defence cooperation which included assistance in areas 
such as dentistry, resource management and naval dockyard refitting, as well as VIP visits 
and inspections to ascertain further training and exercising opportunities.  At the outset, 
defence links were recognised for their “part of the total effort” to “increase cooperation 
with Indonesia in all fields.”391 
 
Stopovers in Indonesia while in transit to FPDA exercises provided New Zealand 
warships and aircraft the opportunity to exercise on a limited basis with the TNI.  A more 
formal programme of joint naval and air exercises followed which  were considered 
significant as Indonesia seldom exercised with foreign counterparts in line with its non-
aligned and self-reliant stance.
392
  Green considered that the small size and lack of hostile 
intent posed by New Zealand military forces facilitated the gradual expansion by 
Indonesia of defence cooperation from the mid-1970s through to the mid-1990s.  The 
high regard in which Indonesia held its relationship with New Zealand could be gauged 
by the 1979 visit of Indonesian ships to New Zealand, only the second time they had 
ventured out of Indonesian territorial waters.
393
  It was also noted in 1981 that the New 
Zealand defence attaché was the only one allowed to walk freely around Indonesian 
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military facilities without an escort.
394
  Former Ambassador Michael Green attributed this 
to the small size of New Zealand forces and New Zealand’s lack of any hostile 
motives.
395
  Despite these positive developments, the defence relationship was not 
particularly active.  The New Zealand defence attaché observed at the time that the 
programme sending Indonesia officers to New Zealand “started off with a hiss and a roar, 
but [...] was temporarily suspended due to financial limitations.”  Low-level naval 
exercises continued to take place every two years, while air force exercises occurred more 
occasionally, into the 1990s.
396
 The last Army exercise between Indonesia and New 
Zealand occurred in 1980.    
 
Other than joint military exercises (discussed below), much of New Zealand’s military 
cooperation with Indonesia has been conducted through the Mutual Assistance 
Programme.  MAP links with Indonesia began in 1973 and by 1994, Indonesia was 
receiving the second greatest share of New Zealand military assistance after Malaysia.
397
  
Once Indonesia began acquiring the Skyhawk aircraft, which was also in the New 
Zealand inventory, training and exercises broadened.
398
  For more than five years the 
New Zealand air force was the only foreign air force to conduct operational exercises 
with that of Indonesia.
399
   
 
Differences in language, capabilities, military culture and strategic outlook limited the 
defence relationship however.  For example, an invitation to send a New Zealand student 
to Indonesia’s Staff and Command College in the mid-1980s had to be declined due to the 
lack of a qualified officer able to speak Indonesian.
400
  It was also reported that the 
Indonesians continued to be suspicious about New Zealand. A request to use Indonesian 
territory by Singapore-based RNZAF aircraft was declined due to suspicion on the part of 
Indonesia about New Zealand motives.
401
  During the 1990s, fewer and fewer TNI 
personnel passed through MAP training. 
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Relations were hampered by the TNI’s human rights abuses in Timor, and in particular by 
units such as Kopassus (discussed further in the next section).  Human rights and peace 
movements within New Zealand increasingly condemned TNI activities and New 
Zealand’s complicity by training and supporting them.  Opponents criticised the 
arguments put forward by officials defending defence ties, pointing out that the 
contention that military links provided opportunities to make New Zealand’s views 
known on Timor was “hypocrisy” by “training a military to kill more efficiently and at 
the same time criticising them for doing just that.”402  Opponents argued that 20 years of 
cooperation had not changed the TNI’s focus on internal security or encouraged 
professionalism or respect for democracy and the rule of law: 
 
 In seeking training with New Zealand, the Indonesian armed forces know what 
they want and the NZDF claims to provide just that: increased effectiveness of 
their armed forces. Training in combat in the military environment (which is 
inherently and openly undemocratic) is hardly the best way to export 
democratic values.
403
 
 
A member of an Indonesian opposition group commented on New Zealand defence ties, 
saying “I think its hypocrisy to maintain that relationship when you know what they are 
doing in Indonesia – killing people and abusing human rights… that just makes them 
stronger and encourages them to behave in an undemocratic way.”404   
 
In September 1999, defence links were cut altogether following the role played by the 
TNI in post-independence ballot violence in Timor.  In his announcement, Defence 
Minister Max Bradford “expressed his regret that New Zealand's long-standing 
relationship with an important regional partner was coming under strain. But the 
fundamental issue - whether a decision openly and democratically arrived at, should be 
allowed to be overturned by intimidation - was too important to ignore.”405  Maire 
Leadbeater, a key figure in New Zealand’s Indonesian human rights movement, wrote “it 
had taken 26 years for the government to decide that the Indonesian military was not so 
                                            
402 Buchanan, New Zealand Military Cooperation with Indonesia, 6. 
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benign after all.”406  Interestingly though, the Defence Attaché in Jakarta remained in his 
post, and was replaced in 2000.  The new officer, not having had the benefit of attending 
Indonesian Staff College, lacked the contacts and penetration into the TNI hierarchy his 
predecessor enjoyed.
407
  Wider defence links were not restored until 2007.  The 
relationship since then is explored in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
The renewal of the Indonesia – New Zealand defence relationship 
With the sixth largest economy in the world, a generally moderate and nominally secular 
approach to Islam and a successful transition to democracy, Indonesia emerged as an 
important and promising partner for New Zealand.  It has emerged as one of the top ten 
export destinations for trade.
408
 
 
Defence cooperation between Indonesia and New Zealand is still regarded as part of a 
broad-based, thorough and close political relationship.
409
  The renewal of defence ties was 
announced by Foreign Minister Winston Peters in a speech in December 2006.  In it, he 
announced that Indonesia had accepted an invitation to have an officer attend Command 
and Staff College in 2007, and that the College's international tour would incorporate 
Indonesia.
410
  Speaking shortly after the TNI officer arrived in New Zealand, Minister of 
Defence Phil Goff stated “Indonesia has made impressive steps to strengthen democracy, 
[…] Sufficient good things have happened so [we need] to acknowledge they have made 
steps towards reform.”411  Foreign Minister Winston Peters detailed these steps, pointing 
out “removal of the armed forces from an active role in politics, the establishment of 
civilian control over the military, the removal of the armed forces from commercial 
activity, and the strengthening of military professionalism…”412 
 
The resumption of military ties may have been assisted by NZDF involvement in tsunami 
relief in the Aceh province in early 2005.  The Foreign Minister at the time, Phil Goff, 
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accompanied the defence force team,
413
 and it was under his term as Defence Minister, 
which he took over in October that year, that ties were eventually restored.  It is important 
to note that despite the 2002 Bali bombing in which Islamic militants killed three New 
Zealanders, the New Zealand government did not revert to old patterns of defence 
cooperation; New Zealand did not restore defence links to make Indonesia an ally of 
convenience under the auspices of countering terrorism.  Instead, it allowed new forms of 
security engagement to begin, notably through a police liaison.
414
  Since 2006, defence 
ties have remained low-key and cautious; limited to education, non-combat training, 
cooperation in humanitarian operations and navy-to-navy engagement.
415
 This was a 
function of both domestic opposition and material limitations on the NZDF’s ability to 
further develop the relationship.
416
   
 
Following Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1999, the controversy over defence 
links might have been expected to decline, however this has not been the case.  In a 
submission to the New Zealand Defence Review 2009, the Indonesia Human Rights 
Committee stated: 
 
 Although New Zealand’s defence ties are not large scale they do serve to 
confer a ‘seal of respectability’ on the Indonesian military just as such ties did 
during the Suharto era...
417
 
 
While reforms saw the military’s role in political life curtailed and responsibility for 
internal security functions passed to the police, defence cooperation remained a sensitive 
subject within New Zealand due to Indonesia’s failure to hold military personnel 
accountable for past crimes, as well as an inability to stop ongoing human rights abuses 
that continue to occur in Indonesia’s other restive provinces such as West Papua and 
Aceh.
418
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Maire Leadbeater wrote in 2010 that “The military has never faced up to its role in 
supporting Suharto’s tyranny and its officers remain unaccountable for their crimes 
against humanity. Credible charges of horrendous East Timor crimes have proved no 
barrier to advancement…”419  The key issue was the TNI’s culpability for gross human 
rights abuses in East Timor.  Opponents of New Zealand’s links to Indonesia point out 
that “since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, no high ranking Indonesian military 
officer has been prosecuted for a human rights crime...” and they insist that military 
cooperation should be conditional on these leaders being brought to trial.
420
 
 
In terms of New Zealand defence policy, Robert Ayson noted that the 2010 Defence 
White Paper had a “worrying absence” of any mention at all of Indonesia.421  This lack of 
official acknowledgement of military ties to Indonesia was puzzling considering that 
Indonesia is New Zealand’s nearest Asian neighbour.422  However it perhaps made sense 
considering the high degree of public disapproval of the TNI and its complicity in human 
rights abuses.  The low level of contemporary NZDF cooperation serves to keep the 
relationship out of the public eye.  However, there is a high level of public scrutiny within 
New Zealand.  Defence relations with Indonesia were in the public eye as recently as 
2012 with condemnation about a Kopassus
423
 officer being trained at Staff and Command 
College.  Catherine Delahunty, a Green Party Member of Parliament, stated “the Defence 
Force's role in training someone from a military unit well known for human rights abuses 
compromises the reputation of New Zealand.”424   The issue of human rights abuses, 
particularly the failure to hold anyone accountable for them, will continue to hamper New 
Zealand’s defence diplomacy with Indonesia.  
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High-level exchanges since 2007 
High-level military exchanges between Indonesia and New Zealand since 2007 are listed 
in Table 7.  It is notable that no New Zealand Defence Minister has visited Jakarta since 
the renewal of defence relations.  Phil Goff did visit Jakarta, but characterised his visit as 
part of his Trade portfolio. He did however meet Indonesian Defence Minister Juworno 
Sudarsono during this visit. 
 
Table 7: High-level Defence Exchanges between Indonesia and New Zealand since 2007 
Date Delegation 
August 2007 Phil Goff, Minster of Defence (as Trade Minister). 
 
15-19  August 2009 Rear Admiral Tony Parr, Chief of Navy to Indonesia. 
 
April 2011 John McKinnon, Secretary of Defence to Indonesia. 
 
Early 2012 Lieutenant General Rhys Jones, Chief of Defence Force to 
Indonesia.  
 
16-18 September 2012 Rear Admiral Tony Parr, Chief of Navy to Indonesia. 
 
 
Educational and Functional exchanges since 2007 
The NZDF regarded officer exchanges, continued attendance at the NZDF Staff College 
and greater English language training as essential areas for the TNI’s development.  
These activities were focused at junior to mid-level officers who will be the TNI’s next 
generation of leaders, and the intent was to both professionalise them and provide them 
with skills to enable them to conduct operations with other multinational partners.  
Numbers each year are small, and are nowhere near the 25-30 Indonesian personnel each 
year that were being trained in the 1990s.  In return, Indonesia held a place open for a 
NZDF student at the Institute of National Resilience (Lemhannas) in Jakarta. Students 
from the institute have visited New Zealand, most recently for three days in early 
September 2012.  There have been a number of functional exchanges, consisting mainly 
of meetings to coordinate cooperation, such as the visit by Paul Sinclair, the Head of the 
International Defence Relations Branch to Jakarta for defence talks in October 2010. 
 
Port calls since 2007 
Naval cooperation between the RNZN and the Indonesian Navy, the TNI-Angkatan Laut, 
did not resume until 2009 and have remained low key, but it was regarded as an important 
 Chapter Six  109 
 
 
development in the renewed relationship.  On the occasion of the first contact, which 
occurred during the Indonesian fleet review, the NZDF was at pains to explain this as a 
multinational event rather than a bilateral one.
425
  Ship visits between Indonesia and New 
Zealand since the resumption of defence ties are listed below in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Port calls conducted by Indonesia and New Zealand since 2007 
Date Details 
12-20 August 2009 HMNZS Canterbury visited Manado and Bitung, Sulawesi 
(Indonesian Navy International Fleet Review)  
 
November 2009 
 
HMNZS Endeavour visited Jakarta. 
13 June 2011 HMNZS Te Mana visited Jakarta. 
 
25-29 November 2011 HMNZS Te Kaha visited Surabaya. 
 
 
Multilateral cooperation since 2007 
Indonesia also conducts many defence diplomacy activities through multilateral forums, 
that New Zealand attends, including the range of ASEAN bodies such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and Defence Senior 
Officials Meeting-Plus (which Indonesia agreed to convene
426
), as well as the Shangri-La 
Dialogue.  New Zealand chaired the ADMM+ Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping 
Operations with the Philippines. As part of the process it co-hosted a meeting held in 
Indonesia in 2013.  In 2011, Indonesia established its own Jakarta International Defence 
Dialogue (JIDD).  This annual event brought military and defence ministry officials 
together with academics from the Indonesian Defence University.  Indonesia’s intent was 
to establish JIDD as the region’s principal security coordination mechanism.427  One 
commentator interpreted this as a bid to indigenise security policy discourse in Asia to 
supplement or even replace the Western-managed Shangri-La Dialogue as the region’s 
principal security dialogue.
428
   Indonesia and New Zealand have also cooperated on 
functional groupings like PAMS, which New Zealand attended in Jakarta in August 2008, 
and the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference.  
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Issues in Indonesia-New Zealand Defence Diplomacy 
While New Zealand’s defence cooperation with China and Viet Nam have not proven to 
be controversial, defence cooperation with Indonesia continues to be highly contentious 
within New Zealand.  The Indonesia case study provides three particularly illustrative 
examples of the dilemmas encountered; maintaining links with authoritarian regimes, 
applying conditions on those relations and striking a balance between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
defence diplomacy. 
 
Purposes of Indonesia - New Zealand Defence Diplomacy and its Dilemmas  
The rationale for New Zealand’s military cooperation with Indonesia can be found in the 
prevailing strategic context of each era.  In the late 1960s through to the 1980s, 
communist insurgencies threatened much of South East Asia. In Indonesia itself, the 
military crackdown in 1965 took place in response to the growing influence of the 
Communist Party and the purge that followed killed an estimated 500,000 Communist 
Party members and sympathisers. Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975 followed 
the expected rise to power of the left-wing FRETILIN party following the provinces’ 
independence from Portugal.  Western countries around the region were more concerned 
with the spread of communism than the internal policies of authoritarian governments like 
Indonesia.  The end of the Cold War altered the strategic environment shaping the 
policies of Western governments, making them less willing to support authoritarian allies 
and pushing support for democracy further up the policy agenda.
429
   
 
New Zealand defence cooperation was seen as a convenient way of creating other 
channels into a regime that was dominated by the military.
430
  Demonstrating an early 
grasp of the concept of ‘new’ diplomacy, NZDF officers recognised in 1981 the “valuable 
political spin-off from the defence relationship” which was an “excellent example of the 
way in which our armed forces could be used in support of our foreign policy 
objectives.”431  Generating a favourable impression of New Zealand was also expected to 
bring wider benefits in terms of trade.
432
  New Zealand policymakers decided that defence 
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was an important issue for Indonesia, so it made sense that New Zealand needed to 
understand the TNI and be able to engage with Indonesia about defence issues important 
to them both.
433
   
 
From the outset, New Zealand officials expressed concerns about links with an 
authoritarian regime.  In a diplomatic cable to the Jakarta embassy before the 
formalisation of relations, a New Zealand official noted a close relationship with 
Indonesia must be through the military for “they make the running of every aspect of 
Indonesian administration.  Though we do not like this [...] it is the reality of political 
life,” adding that there was “no alternative.”434    
 
New Zealand public opinion of Indonesia had been poor since Sukarno’s days were 
characterised by chaos and militarism.  Suharto’s regime, which began with large-scale 
killings and the detention of hundreds of thousands of political prisoners, was similarly 
repressive and authoritarian.  From early on in the relationship, New Zealand civil society 
groups applied steady pressure on the government over the relationship with Indonesia.
435
  
However, such issues did not tend to impair the development of bilateral relations.  The 
attitude was summed up in a cable sent about the Defence Secretary’s visit to Indonesia in 
1974 which noted growing concerns about political prisoners; “not our business of 
course” but bound to make the concern known to Jakarta. The catalyst for change 
however was the annexation of East Timor, during which New Zealander Gary 
Cunningham and four other journalists were killed by Indonesian troops in Balibo, just 
after New Zealand military contacts were formalised.
436
   
 
Concerns about the human rights record of the TNI in Timor grew, leading to 
disenchantment with the Suharto regime amongst both the public and officials. In the 
mid-1980s the NZDF dropped air weapons delivery training from the MAP syllabus 
following advice from the embassy in Jakarta that Skyhawks were being used against 
Timorese rebels. Two years later, MAP courses were limited to combat support and civic 
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aid training after Indonesian personnel trained in combat techniques by the New Zealand 
Army began operating in Timor.
437
   
 
The purposes that had been put forward by New Zealand officials increasingly reflected 
the double standard that Cottey and Forster identified was inherent in Western defence 
diplomacy with authoritarian regimes.
438
  In the mid-1990s, defence officials defended 
defence links, arguing they would encourage the TNI to become more disciplined, 
professional and outwardly focused, and instil New Zealand democratic values in the 
TNI.
439
  Defence Minister Max Bradford, discussing the training of an Indonesian officer 
at the NZDF Defence College, said the officer would learn “the process of democratic 
government, the Geneva Convention and laws of armed conflict.”440  Furthermore, the 
reasoning went, military links provided an opportunity to make our views known about 
human rights abuses by the military.  However, there was very little evidence that New 
Zealand officials did pass on concerns about these matters.
441
  
 
Advocates of military relations claimed that military engagement with the TNI was often 
misunderstood by the media and other government departments.
442
  For example, the 
purpose of Australian engagement with the TNI during the 1990s was described as 
providing a better understanding of the military and its role in the Indonesian government.  
It aimed to build the closest military relationship that was “morally possible.”443  A 
former Australian Army Attaché to Indonesia stated that the relationship provided 
Australia with “great understanding, strategic leverage with our allies, and increased [our] 
overall strategic credibility.”444  Former Australian defence attaché to Indonesia Jim 
Molan argues cooperation with the TNI during the 1990s proved of much broader value 
by allowing the Australian government to make policy decisions about intervention in 
East Timor more confidently.
445
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In a similar manner, New Zealand Army officer Colonel Neville Reilly ensured the 
security of the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) during the crisis, 
including pulling off several daring rescues of United Nations staff including a siege of 
the Mission’s compound by militia forces. His ability to do so was aided by his 
diplomatic skills and Bahasa language ability,
446
 acquired during his time at Indonesian 
Staff College which gave him close links to senior TNI officers, including Lieutenant 
General Yudhoyono.
447
 Reilly’s links with Yudhoyono, who would later become 
President, dated back to 1996, when they worked together as military observers in 
Bosnia.
448
 These links enabled Colonel Reilly to act, in the words of Chris Elder, “as an 
extremely effective and thoughtful operator” during his time as New Zealand Defence 
Attaché in Jakarta between 2000 and 2003.
449
  
 
Most recently, similar arguments have been made to justify renewed links to the TNI.  
Proponents of defence links argue that TNI needs support in adjusting to its 
circumstances within a democratic state.  Some analysts also point out that human rights 
are important, but often there are more compelling reasons for engagement. Writing in 
1999, Australian analyst Paul Dibb wrote: 
 
 Human rights issues have an undeniably important place in international 
diplomacy, but are of little help at present to a vast nation such as Indonesia 
struggling to maintain its social and political cohesion.
450
 
 
Cottey and Forster recognised defence diplomacy’s lack of utility as a means of 
influencing civil-military relations in authoritarian regimes.  Cottey and Forster argue that 
it was only those states that are reforming; that is those beginning democratic transitions 
or attempting to consolidate democratic gains, that are amenable to external influence.  In 
these cases, they argued, defence diplomacy provides important political and practical 
support for the democratisation of civil-military relations.
451
  Cottey and Forster point out 
that, at the time of writing in 2004, Indonesia was a state “characterised by partial or 
stalled transitions, where elements of democratisation are in place, but the military 
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remains sufficiently powerful to resist further change.”452 They conclude that while 
military engagement might be helpful, it was unlikely to achieve a decisive breakthrough.   
 
Advocates of military cooperation argued that exercises and training with the NZDF 
encouraged the TNI to become more professional.  Professionalism in a military sense 
played up the role of discipline, structure, order, self-sacrifice, as well as expertise in the 
application of force.  By virtue of these attributes, professional military forces were 
considered more likely to accept civilian control.  The TNI’s former dwi fungsi role and 
self-funding model made it difficult to promote professionalism and encourage good 
civil-military relations. Consequently, the recent reforms of the TNI were likely to 
improve the ability of New Zealand defence diplomacy activities to impart this kind of 
professionalism.  
 
Writing prior to the Timor crisis, Jim Rolfe described the cutting of defence links as an 
“overreaction” and said that “New Zealand will do better by working with Indonesia, and 
demonstrating that there are other, more effective ways of using the armed forces, than in 
shouting at her from a distance and being ignored.”453 
 
Reconciling the Indonesia - New Zealand defence relationship with the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements 
The Five Power Defence Arrangements, which were examined in Chapter Three as a 
form of New Zealand’s ‘old’ defence diplomacy, had their origins in Indonesian 
Konfrontasi, a policy directed against the post-colonial establishment of the Federation of 
Malaysia.  
 
As early as 1968, New Zealand recognised the potential for military contacts to encourage 
Indonesia to continue to accommodate Malaysia and Singapore, as well as other Western 
countries, while discouraging any further foreign adventurism.
454
   
 
Once the FPDA was established in 1971, a practical purpose for maintaining defence 
links, albeit one not acknowledged publicly, was to maintain Indonesian consent to use 
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their waters and airspace to transit to New Zealand’s FPDA partners.455  Another 
objective of defence cooperation was to promote the idea that the Arrangements were not 
directed against Indonesia; something demonstrated by New Zealand’s cooperative 
engagement.
456
 
 
New Zealand considered the traditional relationship with the FPDA partners as more 
important than the relationship with Indonesia.
457
  Interestingly though, in the early 1980s 
Ministry of Defence policymakers indicated a desire to “expand our MAP activities with 
Indonesia, even if this was to be at the expense of a slight reduction in the Malaysian and 
Singapore programmes.”458 
 
Since 1971, the FPDA brought member countries together for regular military exercises 
and has served as a major confidence-building mechanism in the region.  Most analysts 
agreed that the FPDA transformed some time ago from a collective security arrangement 
into a networking and confidence-building mechanism.  However, it has continued to be 
viewed negatively by Indonesia because of the misperception that it is directed primarily 
against them.
459
  Indonesia has always tended to have a dim view of alliances involving 
external powers and, as a prominent member of ASEAN, it had little interest joining the 
Arrangements, in which it would have been a junior member.  In 1990, a former 
Indonesian foreign minister called on the FPDA to be abandoned and replaced with a tri-
lateral arrangement excluding the external powers.
460
 However, some military figures like 
former commander and Minister of Defence General Benny Moerdani, took a broader 
view of the Arrangements, arguing “if Malaysian and Singaporean security is enhanced 
by this arrangement, so is regional security.”461  Overall, Indonesian officials seem to 
have had a similar view to that of New Zealand MFAT in the 1980s and 1990s, seeing the 
FPDA as having little practical relevance.
462
  Over time, ties with Singapore and Malaysia 
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have grown through ASEAN, while Australia and New Zealand have developed military 
links with Indonesia.   
 
Conclusion 
New Zealand’s defence ties with Indonesia are somewhat paradoxical.  While Indonesia 
has been a functioning democracy for some time, bilateral defence relations have proved 
more difficult to develop than those with China or Vietnam, due to the level of domestic 
political sensitivity.  Comparing the number of defence activities with Indonesia to that 
with China and even Viet Nam over the same period reveals the clear limitations on the 
relationship.  This is particularly significant when considering the numbers of Indonesian 
personnel visiting New Zealand for training and visits at the peak of the relationship in 
the 1980s.   
 
Domestic opposition to improving defence diplomacy remains strong in New Zealand 
despite the progress made by Indonesia over the last decade in promoting democracy, 
good civil-military relations, and promoting respect for the rule-of-law and human rights 
amongst the military. 
 
By arguing that military contacts encourage the TNI to respect democracy and human 
rights, New Zealand policy-makers invited the dilemma of having to choose between 
creating a double standard, and in doing so, accept criticism that its cooperation with 
Indonesia is not working, or cut off cooperation and lose what little influence they had 
with the regime. As Michael Green argued, the tendency of human rights groups to 
denounce defence links as complicity in repression and the tendency of defence and 
government officials to defend them as leverage on the Indonesian regime both overstated 
New Zealand’s ability to influence Indonesia’s behaviour.463  
 
In New Zealand’s case, it took the role played by the TNI in the post-ballot violence in 
East Timor and intervention by New Zealand forces in 1999 to finally put a halt to the 
relationship.  What little influence New Zealand had over the government in Indonesia 
was then affected the by the loss of access to the Indonesian Staff College, which   
negatively impacted upon the ability of the new defence attaché to operate effectively. 
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The success of defence diplomacy, or any form of strategic engagement for that matter, 
relies on being viewed as a long-term process of promoting change.  Making cooperation 
linked too closely to short-term developments, made conditional on specific reforms, or 
broken off in the face of temporary setbacks will not result in success.  Cottey and Forster 
argue that over the long-term, the process of strategic engagement may do more for 
human rights and democracy than short-term sanctions or the suspension of defence 
diplomacy, but the problem then becomes one of providing regimes with implicit support.  
Cottey and Forster claim that defence diplomacy can only be successful in delivering 
improved civil-military relations and professionalism in regimes that have already begun 
to reform.  New Zealand’s defence relations with Indonesia illustrate these dilemmas.   
 
New Zealand’s broader bilateral relationship with Indonesia is only likely to increase in 
importance into the future. However, the defence component of this relationship is likely 
to remain low key.  Perhaps now, more than ever, is the time for New Zealand to be 
strengthening defence links with the TNI for the purpose of promoting democratic civil-
military relations. The NZDF could offer training in laws of armed conflict and encourage 
and socialise respect for the rule of law and human rights. The Ministry of Defence could 
engage the TNI to provide advice on reforming and civilianising the management of 
defence policy, developing systems for management and control of the defence budget, 
and training civilian defence officials.  Track II engagement could occur to encourage 
transparency, freedom of information and debate between defence-oriented civil society 
advocacy and campaigning groups. 
 
Indonesia is keen to increase bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy with New 
Zealand.  Within New Zealand, foreign affairs and the military are also enthusiastic, but 
they remain aware of the strength of public opinion on the issue of human rights.  For this 
reason, for the time being, an expansion of defence diplomacy seems unlikely to expand 
beyond limited education and training.  The NZDF has no plans to establish a formal 
bilateral defence cooperation agreement, and point out that structural and financial 
resources did not currently permit any expansion of the bilateral cooperation 
programme.
464
  While some kind of formal agreement around Indonesia-New Zealand 
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defence cooperation is a long-term goal, immediate priorities remain the initial steps 
needed to rebuild the relationship. A practical challenge will be to develop the defence 
relationship in ways that are in the interests of both countries.   
 
New Zealand’s experience with Indonesia also serves to demonstrate how bilateral 
relationships that lack strong foundations and public support can easily become hostage to 
single issues like human rights.  As time goes on it will become increasingly important to 
resolve this issue to ensure that defence diplomacy activities can progress as Indonesia 
increases in strategic significance, not only to New Zealand, but amongst South East 
Asian nations. 
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Chapter Seven Conclusion 
This thesis has examined how New Zealand has used defence diplomacy – the idea that 
the military forces of a state can have a role in peacetime diplomacy and in conflict 
prevention and resolution.  In 2004, Cottey and Forster questioned whether defence 
diplomacy was merely a transitional phase, a primarily European phenomenon in the 
immediate post-Cold War era.
465
  This thesis demonstrates that defence diplomacy has 
had application far beyond Europe and has had lasting relevance.  It finds New Zealand 
has been receptive to the idea, perhaps because, as Gerald Hensley notes, in the absence 
of a direct threat, defence has generally been seen as one dimension of the country’s 
broader foreign policy.  
 
One of the aims of this study was to determine whether New Zealand’s defence relations 
had significantly changed in the post-Cold War period.  This thesis finds that New 
Zealand adopted defence diplomacy well before the term itself was coined.  The early 
employment of the concept in the immediate post-Cold War era reflected the changing 
nature of New Zealand’s security interests.  The country has traditionally used its military 
to fight wars overseas and to ensure its interests were taken into account by its major 
allies.  Prior to the Second World War, the key partner was Britain.  Between 1945 and 
the mid-1980s it increasingly became the United States.  In the post-Cold War world, 
however, security increasingly meant constructing a spider web of bilateral and 
multilateral linkages with allies, partners but also non-like-minded states to ensure New 
Zealand’s views were heard.  For new Asian partners like China and Viet Nam, a 
military-to-military relationship was one of a range of links that complemented growing 
bilateral political and economic ties.  As New Zealand’s economic relations became more 
open and varied, so too New Zealand’s defence and foreign policies have changed and 
moved away from a focus on alliance management and territorial defence to broader 
regional security engagement.  
 
New Zealand was not only an early adopter of defence diplomacy, it was also an 
enthusiastic one.  New Zealand commenced defence ties with a range of new partners in 
1998 and since that time has greatly expanded the range and frequency of contacts. 
Defence relationships that began with the exchange of attachés and perhaps one high-
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level visit each year have expanded over the space of just over a decade to a regular series 
of strategic dialogues, high-level exchanges, ship visits, educational links, interactions at 
multilateral fora and military exercises.  The momentum shows no signs of abating either, 
with the announcement of new defence links with India in 2011 and the prospect of 
combat exercises with China mooted.
466
  
 
Examining the development of New Zealand’s defence ties with new partners, there is 
evidence that much of the initiative and the pace of progress has been driven by them.  
For example, China seems to have used the NZDF as an incubator or test case for 
engagement with larger Western military forces.  New Zealand is seen by the Chinese as 
a Western democracy, but one that is small, unthreatening and where missteps will be 
overlooked.  In the Viet Nam case, defence engagement seems to have been driven by 
Viet Nam’s growing sense of itself as an active and responsible regional player. In both 
these cases New Zealand has proved happy to reciprocate and sees advantages of its own 
from military-to-military ties.  It clearly benefits from high-level access to defence policy 
makers in Asia and the opportunity to exchange views on regional security issues.  New 
Zealand’s interest in defence ties is therefore arguably less to do with any intrinsic value 
in narrow defence terms, and more because it shares with its new partners the desire to 
have defence ties as part of a comprehensive political relationship.  As Tony Browne puts 
it, “If China is going to be engaging with a country in a significant manner, they will 
expect there to be a defence component.”467  The armed forces of China, Viet Nam and 
Indonesia are significant political actors in their countries; as a result, the military 
dimension of the bilateral relationship seems to be more important to these countries than 
it is to New Zealand.  
 
In contrast, New Zealand foreign affairs and defence officials see military ties as 
supporting broader foreign policy objectives.       The primacy of broader foreign policy 
objectives over military-to-military links was illustrated by MFAT’s reluctance to 
recommend an RNZN ship visit to Da Nang, a Vietnamese naval base, in deference to a 
visit to Ho Chi Minh City in support of New Zealand commercial and consular interests.  
Interviews with senior Defence and Foreign Affairs officials in New Zealand suggest that 
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defence diplomacy is really about the high-level contacts needed for the purposes of 
broader strategic engagement.   
 
There are, however, subtle differences in the way Defence and Foreign Ministry actors 
perceive defence diplomacy.  It is possible to discern from New Zealand doctrine and to 
glean from conversations with NZDF personnel that the Defence Force sees defence 
cooperation as helping to build confidence between potential foes and assist those 
countries struggling to build capacity and improve governance.  It is a way of establishing 
personal relationships through which greater understanding can be forged.  In times of 
crisis, this understanding can help to reduce misinterpretations of the other side’s 
motivations and actions and open channels of communication, something that proved to 
be invaluable for Defence Force attaché Neville Reilly in East Timor.  For the NZDF, 
defence diplomacy entails undertaking activities that enhance shared understanding, and 
build linkages and lines of communication between dissimilar forces.
468
  None of the 
MFAT officials interviewed for this thesis saw defence diplomacy in such ambitious 
terms.  
 
Unlike the original British concept, New Zealand’s defence diplomacy in Asia has not 
often been about promoting democracy and respect for human rights. New Zealand 
simply does not have the resources to engage with and assist military forces in post 
democratic or post-conflict societies.  Officials in New Zealand’s foreign policy and 
defence sector frequently refer to the power of visits and exchanges between defence 
forces to assist in the development of positive norms, like improved civil-military 
relations for example, in those forces being engaged.  In practice however, there is little 
evidence to suggest that defence links achieve these goals in Asia.  For a start, New 
Zealand never sought to influence the PLA or VPA in this way.  Concerns about human 
rights are always pursued through other diplomatic channels.   As the Indonesian case 
demonstrated, defence ties with authoritarian regimes are often justified in terms of their 
ability to influence those in power and the behaviour of their military.  Claiming to seek 
improved respect for democracy and human rights via defence ties with the Suharto 
regime in Indonesia simply invited accusations of double standards.  Opponents of 
defence links inevitably labelled these assertions to be hypocritical.   
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New Zealand’s defence diplomacy does not feature a great deal of explicit conditionality, 
but it does occur.  While New Zealand and our new partners do not have deep strategic 
differences that complicate the relationship, public opinion has proved to be a factor in 
defence relations with certain countries.  In terms of the case studies explored here, 
domestic political concerns led New Zealand to suspend its defence relations with 
Indonesia as a result of the actions of the TNI.  Concerns about TNI complicity in human 
rights abuses had been simmering away for years, and were acknowledged by officials, 
but these had little discernible effect on defence relations until violence broke out in East 
Timor in 1999.  When comparisons are drawn between Indonesia on the one hand and 
China and Viet Nam, states that have their own issues with human rights, on the other, it 
might be concluded that it is only where the military can be directly linked to human 
rights abuses or interference with democratic political processes that it becomes an issue 
for New Zealand.  The particularly problematic relationship with the TNI also reflects the 
influence of well organised New Zealand groups focused on Indonesia, East Timor and 
West Papua.
469
    
 
There is a paradox here.  Defence ties with Indonesia have proven hardest to maintain at a 
time when that country has been a vibrant democracy.  Meanwhile, growing military ties 
with authoritarian China and Viet Nam have passed with almost no comment.  
 
A final aim of this study was to determine whether New Zealand’s defence diplomacy 
fulfils similar roles to those of other states such as the United Kingdom, where the 
concept was first articulated.  In their seminal study, Cottey and Forster identified two 
patterns of defence diplomacy.  The first is defence cooperation between established 
democracies, underpinned by shared threats and common values, together with 
cooperation between Western democracies and allies of convenience, most notably in the 
‘War on Terror’.  The second is strategic engagement with former or potential enemies in 
order to prevent conflict and improve wider political relations and support to states 
undergoing major domestic change, in particular democratisation and post-conflict 
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reconstruction.
470
  As we saw in Chapter Three, the analytical framework developed by 
Cottey and Forster can be readily applied to New Zealand’s practice and provides a useful 
way of conceptualising New Zealand’s myriad forms of defence cooperation.  At the root 
of ‘old’ defence diplomacy lies the requirement to prepare for the use of force; in this 
case the development of another country’s military to both defend themselves and operate 
alongside New Zealand.  Meanwhile, the basis for ‘new’ defence diplomacy is conflict 
prevention through bilateral and multilateral engagement.  New Zealand’s approach to 
defence diplomacy tends to fall somewhere between these two patterns.  New Zealand 
defence relations with China, Viet Nam and Indonesia reflect the underlying goal of ‘old’ 
defence diplomacy designed to enhance the collective ability to deal with common 
threats.  In these cases, the common threats are the emerging non-traditional security 
issues such as terrorism, piracy and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief.   While their 
domestic political systems might differ, New Zealand, China, Viet Nam and Indonesia 
have overlapping interests in some of these areas.   
 
That notwithstanding, these new military relationships remain complicated by traditional 
balance of power concerns and the preservation of military capability.  As former 
Defence Minister Wayne Mapp puts it, these are not values-based relationships.
471
  
Because of this, the ability of these new defence ties to grow and deepen far beyond their 
present state must remain doubtful.   
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Appendix One Interview Information 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
Researcher: Justin Fris: School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
 
I am a student at Victoria University of Wellington undertaking a Master of Arts in International Relations.  To 
complete this degree I am writing a thesis focused on analysing New Zealand’s military engagement with the armed 
forces of former and potential adversaries. 
 
As part of my research I am interviewing past and present politicians and government officials involved in the 
development and conduct of New Zealand’s military relations with a range of armed forces in Asia. If you agree to 
participate in this research, it is envisaged that the interview will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. During 
the interview I will ask a series of questions about how and why the military relationships developed and the issues that 
arose.  I am happy to attend your place of work or your home for the interview. 
 
I have obtained ethics approval from the University for this interview. Participation in this project is voluntary and you  
may choose whether or not to answer any particular question(s). 
 
Where interviews are audio recorded and transcribed, a transcript of the interview will be made available to you for 
your approval. If requested, your audio recording can be returned to you at the conclusion of the project.  All hard copy 
recordings and transcripts will be kept in a locked cabinet only accessible by me. Any electronic information will be 
kept in a password-protected file with access limited to me. No other person will hear the audio recording or see the 
interview transcripts other than my supervisors. Recordings will be deleted at the conclusion of the project, while all 
transcripts will be destroyed two years after the end of the project. 
 
Should you feel the need to withdraw from the project, you may do so without question prior to 30 April 2013. Please 
contact me if this is the case. 
 
The information collected during the interview will contribute to my thesis. Individual quotes from interviews may be 
used in the final thesis. If so, they will be attributed to the participant. The final thesis will be submitted for marking to 
the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations. A copy can be made available to 
participants if requested. The final thesis will also be deposited at the Victoria University Library.  
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project please contact me at 
frisjust@myvuw.ac.nz or phone 04 496 0536. Alternatively, you may contact either of my supervisors, Dr David Capie 
or Prof Robert Ayson, at the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations at Victoria 
University, PO Box 600, Wellington. They can be contacted at david.capie@vuw.ac.nz, rob.ayson@vuw.ac.nz, or 
phone 04 463 7483 or 04 463 6445 respectively. 
 
 
Justin Fris 
 
 
Signed: 
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Interview Questions 
 
1. Why does New Zealand have defence links with country x? 
 
2. How did the defence relationship with country x come about? 
 
3. During the development of the defence relationship with country x, was there a set 
path followed? 
 
4. What does New Zealand get out of the defence relationship? 
 
5. What do you believe country x gets out of the defence relationship? 
 
6. How is the defence relationship with country x coordinated with New Zealand’s 
wider foreign policy objectives towards the country? Are there any issues regarding 
primacy i.e. which agency decides the parameters of the relationship? 
 
7. Has the defence relationship with country x been impacted by New Zealand 
domestic opinion, and if so, how? 
 
8. Has New Zealand applied any form of conditionality to the relationship with 
country x? 
 
9. Are there any limits to expanding the defence relationship in future? If there are 
none, or they are minor, what form do you think our future relationship will take, 
and why do you think it will take this form? 
 
10. How do you manage the balance between bilateral and multilateral defence 
diplomacy? Is there any preference for one over the other? 
 
11. What do you seek out the relationship? Is this dependent on what you receive from 
the relationship? 
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Participant Consent Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH  
 
Title of Project: New Zealand’s Defence Diplomacy in Asia 
 
Researcher: Justin Fris: School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations. 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I have had an opportunity to 
ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any 
information I have provided) from this project before 31 March 2013 without having to give reasons. 
 
Please tick the boxes below as appropriate: 
 
 I consent to information or opinions that I have given being attributed to me in any reports on this 
research, OR: 
 
 I consent to information or opinions that I have given being used on the condition of anonymity in 
any reports on this research. 
 
 I would like the tape recordings of my interview returned to me / deleted at the conclusion of the 
project. 
 
 I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview before 
publication. 
 
 I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or released to others 
without my written consent. 
 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed. 
 
 I agree to take part in this research. 
  
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
Name of participant: 
 
 
(please print clearly)      Date: 
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